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INTRODUCTION
.Among
.tin..
-topoi cant philosophical theses that Descartes
advanced
,
probably none is regarded as more influential in the
development of Western thought thar. his views about the nature
tund ana body and the relation of persons to each. It is sury.r
men, that there is so little consensus with respect to exactly
What tr)0Se views were
»
and more surprising still that there has
been little attention paid by commentators to Descartes : argume
ior his views. It is my purpose here to examine ids arguments
one of those views, Descartes* claim, that he is not identical w
h_o bo^.y. in so doing i shall a3.so have occasion to discuss
Descartes* arguments for the claim that Ids essence is tc think
To provide a background for our investigation, we should
distinguish among the following claims:
I) Mind and body are distinct.
2) Minds are thinking things.
3) Bodies are extended tilings.
4) Minds are essentially chinking tilings
,
5) Bodies are essentially extended things
.
6) Persons think
.
7) Persons are essentially thinking things
,
8) pe r sons are not essentially extended things
9) Persons are not bodies
.
10) Persons are minds
„
H) Persons are extended.
**
^ ) Persons have bodies
.
13) Persons ere the union of a mind and a body.
Tnere is a divergence of opinion among philosophical commenta-
tors regarding which of the above claims Descartes would embrace and
what he means by them. Generally it is agreed that he held ( 1 ) - ( 9 ;
hut there is disagreement over his commitment to ( 10 ) - ( 13 ). Ke
could not have held them all. ( 10 ) is r.ot compatible with (13),
and for Descartes, it is not compatible with (II).
The commentators on Descartes, at least the interesting ones,
fall into two groups. One consists of those who think that
Descartes held ( 10 ) but not (13). The other consists of those who
tnrr* he held (13) but not (10). Within these two groups commenta-
'"or° the question of Descartes* commitment to (11) and (11)
Historically, the two groups have been about equally represented
despite the fact that Descartes is widely reputed as being philo-
sophy^ most explicit proponent of (13). That so many have chosen
to disregard his pronouncements in favor of (13) probably ewes in
large part to the notorious difficulties inherent in the view and to
Descartes T often apparent disingenuousness in dealing with them. I
shall retrain from taking a position on Descartes 1 commitment to
(10) and (13), since my aim is to focus on (9) and (7). For that
effort, we need not settle on which of (10) and (13) Descartes
embraced
.
In what follows, Chapter I is devoted to discussing Descartes*
technical notions and soma difficulties that arise for his use of
them. Chapters II and III then examine Descartes' arguments for the
distinctness of himself and his body. The last half of Chapter m
is taken up by a discussion of Descartes' arguments for the claim
that his essence is to think.
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CKAPTER I
The primary aim of this work is to discover and to examine
Descartes 1 arguments for the claim that he is not identical with
his bixiy
. That effort will involve, inter alia, a fatrly detalle(j
examination of Descartes' claims that mind and body are distinct
substances and that he is a substance whose whole essence is to
think. As groundwork for what comes later, we should first
investigate those of Descartes' technical notions that play a primary
role in his pronouncements on himself end his body.
Substance
Problems relating to the concept of substance were apparently
of no particular interest to Descartes. In his writings he does
not give attention to such problems for their own sake. His concern
is rather to use the concept of substance in the solution of other
problems and to spend no more time treating the concept than he
deems necessary for the discussion of other problems.
t or the scholastics
,
a substance was an individual
,
concrete
thing. Since Descartes
’ training was scholastic and since he
adopted the terminology of the scholastics, it is tempting to assume
that by ’res 5 he too intends an individual, e.g., Socrates or Fido
.
ita.fortunately, the texts do not easily support such an interpretation.
Neither toes it help much when Descartes defines the notion. In the
Principles
.
he says:
-2 -
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U
a
S
^
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*
-
GSn unders tand .nothing elset oii a thing which so exists that it needs noother thing in order to exist.i
Elsewhere we find a similar definition:
Really the notion of substance is just this -Uiat which can exist by itself without the aid
of tny other substance.
If Descartes means that a substance is something that needs no
ether substance in order to exist, as the second definition seems to
indicate, then his definition is hopelessly circular. But even if
we ignore the apparent circularity of the latter definition, it
is still not much help to be told that substances are things that
can exist by themselves. To be charitable, we can suppose that
Descartes* intent is to draw the distinction between substance ana
attributes, the latter being thought to require the former for their
existence
. But, for example, suppose we grant that we cannot conceive
of wisdom existing without its being an attribute of something, e.g.,
Socrates. Still it is not clear that we can think of Socrates
stripped of ail his properties. If Socrates is a substance, iu
seems that substances too cannot exist without attributes. In
particular, we would expect an essentialist like Descartes to
recognize that every substance is such that there is at least one
property, that which constitutes its essence, that is essential to
it.
To be sure, Descartes might have recognized this fact. In
reply to Objections IV, he says:
But yet substance cannot be first discovered
exi-t?
f
-°
m
Sf fSCt that it; is a thing thats s, for thac xact alone is not observedty us. We may, however, easily discover itby means of any one of its attributes because
Of no LS°
m
v
0n ncticn that notMng is possessed
o *10 attributes, properties, or qualities.
“°r
._v
1S
.
reason
>
when we Per"eive any attribute
we therefore conclude that some existing thing
*
or substance to which it may be attributed is
necessarily present. -5 ’
*N0W there are three waVs of reading the principle that nothing is
possessed of no attributes. We can regard it as stating either
necessary or sufficient or necessary and sufficient conditions for
the existence of an individual substance, in defending the Cogito
passages and in his Arguments Demonstrating the Existence of God
Descartes appeals to the principle as providing a sufficient condition
for the existence of something. 4 But we can allow that in the present
passage it is intended to be read in the stronger fashion.
certainly it is at least to be read as providing a sufficient
condition for the existence of a substance. And if the principle is
so read, then the passage containing it tends to support a scholastic
viev; of individual substance. Wherever we find a property instan-
tiated, there we find also an individual substance that has that:
property
. Further support for such a view comes from an alternative
definition of substance given by Descartes in the reply to Obj ections
II. He- says there that:
Everything in which there resides immediately
,
as in a subject, or by means of which there
exists anything that we perceive, i.e., any
property, quality, or attribute, of which we
have a real idea, is called a Substance. 0
-4-
Ag*in it seems that substances are the ordinary objects of our
everyday world. However, there is a grave difficulty in attributing
this scholastic view to Descartes. He repeatedly refers, throughout
his philosophical writings to the claimed fact that there are just
tnree substances: God, mind, and body. Indeed, only God properly
fits the definition according to which substances have independent
existence. However, Descartes claimed that substances other than
God, which he termed created substances, need only the concurrence
of God in order to exist.
£SH2SMe supports both the view that Descartes thought
substances to require at least one property and the view that there
are only two substances. He says:
But although any one attribute is sufficient
to give us a knowledge of substance, there is
always one principal property of substance
which constitutes its nature' and essence, and
on which all the others depend. Thus extension
in length, breadth, and depth, constitutes the
nature of corporeal substance; and thought
constitutes the nacure of thinking substance.
Descartes held that there are only two essential properties that
belong to created substance: thought and extension. Given that
face there seems to be only two substances, mind and body, since
ever}' created substance has only one essential property and that
property is either thought or extension. But that view conflicts
with Descartes 1 claim that he himself is a substance whose essence
is thought. Descartes did not think himself identical with mind,
though possibly he thought he was a mind.
There is an easy resolution to this difficulty, whose acceptance
I propose, and that is to read Descartes as equivocating on substance,
in sene cases when he speaks of a substance Descartes intends kind
—~St3nCS-’ as when he saVs that there are two created substances,
one thinking and the other corporeal. In other cases when Descartes
speaks Ol' a substance he intends individual substance
, as when he
says that he is a substance whose nature is to think
.
7 m this
case he intends a substance to be understood as being a single
instance of a kind. When Descartes says, "Created substances
however, whether corporeal or thinking
.. .need only the concurrence
of God m order to exist" we understand him to be talking about kinds
of substance and to allow that: there are possibly many different
individual substances, though all are either of a kind that think or
a kind that: are extended
.
3
There
Ssays that
undere hand
then we mu
is one small hitch to my interpretation. When Descartes
there are three substances, God, mind, and body, if we
him as saying that there are tliree kinds of substance
,
s ci
-
llow tnat God is a kind of substance, whereas he would
seem to be an individual substance. But that is no problem if we
allow that God is sui generis
. He is both a kind of substance, a
kind whose members are characterized by infinite perfection, and the
only individual substance that is a member of that kind
.
3 A view
like tills was espoused by St. Thomas with respect: to angels. He
held that an angel was both individual and a separate species.
Essence
Just as he did with regard to the notion of substance, Descartes
-6-
adopts and employs the notions of essential property and essence
Without bothering to first introduce the notions to his readers and
to explain the peculiarities of his use of them. We should attempt
to fill in the gap Descartes has left in his discussion, but the task
wj.11 not be an easy one and success is far from certain.
Essentialism, broadly speaking, is the view that there are
individuals and properties that are such that the individuals have
those properties necessarily, if an individual has a property
essentially, we say, then that individual could not exist without
having that property. In the idiom of modal logic semantics, if an
individual has a property essentially, then that individual has that
property in every possible world containing that individual. Some
philosophers, of course, deny that any properties are essential to
a thing
,
but even they grant this general account of what would be
the case if an object did have a property essentially. Since our
concern will be to assess Descartes 1 claims about' his own essence,
we will not need to adjudicate the general debate. It may turn out,
for example, that some form of essentialism can be made defensible,
but that Descartes 1 cannot. Alternatively, it may turn cut that
Descartes 7 essentialism is acceptable contingent upon the accept-
ability of essentialism in general.
There would seem to be two broad stages to an adequate
evaluation of Descartes 7 arguments for his essence being to think.
First, as groundwork, we ought to tease out a sort of Cartesian
analysis of ’x. has F essentially 1
.
Then we can evaluate the
analysis and see whether Descartes' claims about his own essence
can be established in light of that analysis. The first stage I
shall attempt below; the second, I save for Chapter m.
As a seep coward understanding Descartes' essentialism we can
examine several varieties that have appeared in the tradition to see
how Descartes' compares. Among those offered we can distinguish
four that are instructive for our purpose. 10
A
- te- Lffs fssenaaUsm; for every individual,x, there is a description, D, and a property
that
U
x
h
i-
h
p
t
’
Under D
’
it: is necessarily true
Or, what comes to much the same thing:
For every individual, x, x has some properties
t and G, such that necessarily, for everv x
’
if x has F
,
then x has G .
5
Roderick Chisholm has labeled this variety of essentialism spurious,
since it tells us not that some individual has some property
necessarily, but that every individual is such that there are pairs
of properties such that necessarily if an individual has one
,
then
he has the other, if anything, this doctrine concerns a relationship
among properties, rather than a relationsFlip between individuals and
the properties that they possess.
It is surely not Descartes® essentialism, since his concerns,
as we might put it, the manner in which individuals possess some of
their properti.es
. Spurious Essentialism, however, does go part of
the v;ay toward capturing one of Descartes® intuitions about the
relationships that obtain among properties. In Princioj.e LIU he
says:
-8-
B«t although any one attribute is sufficient
1
° |^"S a knoWied^ of substance, there
which consul P
r 'ln
-i
pal pr°Perty ° f substanceru nstitutes its nature and essence andon which all the others depend Thus ex-
the'nature
***?'* and depth, constitutes
of corporeal substance: and thoughtcons titutes the nature of thinking substanceh*
When he says that the modes a thing has depend upon its
essential attribute, Descartes means to affirm a principle like:
p *) (*) (F) (if F is a mode of thinking, then
necessarily if x has ?, then x thinks)
Here, and in other passages, Descartes seems to embrace a nomen-
clature according to which there are two primary (essential) prope:
ties of created substances, thinking and extension, and all other
properties that a thing may possess are simply modes of one of
these two primary properties. Thus he holds that the various ways
in which one can be said to think, e.g., to believe, to hope, to
fear, to wish, etc., are each of them modes of the more general
property
,
thinking
. The same holds with extension and its modes
,
length, breadth, etc. Given any attribute of a thing, we can infer
its essence. For example, if we are told that a particular substance
has the property of wishing for rain, we can infer that its essence
is thinking.
We con see, then, the sense in which this part of Descartes T
v.iev; is captured by Spurious Essentialism. Descartes seems to have
held that everything is such that necessarily if it has an attribute
that is a mode of thinking or extension, then it also has the
property of being a thinking thing or of being ar. extended thing.
^
-9
Descartes' view is in one respect stronger, and in another more
restricted, than Spurious Essentialism. The latter holds only
that some properties are such that necessarily whatever has the one
h” S ttle other
> 3-- e -! pairs of properties are such as to be, by
necessity, jointly exemplified. Descartes' view is more restricted
in that for him the jointly exemplified pairs are ordered. 13 it-
is not necessarily the case that whatever thinks also hopes, but it
is necessarily the case that whatever hopes also thinks. Descartes'
view is stronger in that it, unlike Spurious Essentialism, holds
not only that attributes are necessarily jointly exemplified, but
also that things necessarily have at least one of the properties
that they have
.
This is * bf°°d place to bring up what might be thought to be
a problem for Descartes 1 view that substances have only one essential
property. It would seem that God, who is an individual substance,
is privileged to possess not just one essential property, as is the
case with created substances, but rather a rich array of them.
Descartes does not speak to the problem, but it is easy to see that
it can be circumvented
. We simply regard infinite perfection as
being God’s one essential property. Then infinite perfection, like
the primary attributes of corporeal and mental substances, can be
viewed as supporting all of the other of God’s attributes, which
are its modes. Being infinitely perfect, then, entails being
necessarily existent, omniscient, omnipotent, etc. This account
does not achieve exact symmetry with the case of created substances,
- 10-
sine, God, unlike the latter, cannot fail to have any of the modes
Of his essential attribute. But the account seems close enough to
enable Descartes to claim That all substances have one essential
property on which all their others depend.
Tnis is also a good point at which to mention that most of
Descartes * pronouncements on substance, essence, and mode are just
that, pronouncements. There is very little argumentation for any of
the claims made with respect to Descartes » technical notions, it
is, of course, part of the nature of one kind of system building
that the foundation is left unchallenged. There the interesting
question is whether the foundation supports the superstructure it is
claimed to support. And, to be fair, Descartes does provide argu-
mentation when he builds on top of his basic principles. But we
will later have occasion to lament, as some of his objectors did,
Descar ces' lack of support for his basic claims. This will be
especially true when we return to Descartes’ discussion of his
essence and the essence of mind and body in Chapter m 0
Spurious Sssentialism is perhaps most interesting from the
point of view of contemporary discussion, because it seems to be
involved in the notion of essentialism to which Quine so vigorously
objects. The now famous passage in which Quine sets out his objec-
tion is from Word and Object, p. 199:
Perhaps I can evoke the appropriate sense of
bewilderment as follows
. Mathematicians may
conceivably be said to be necessarily rational
and not necessarily two-legged; and cyclists
necessarily two-legged and not necessarily
- 11 -
rn,m°
nsl
* But
.
what Of an individual whocounts among his eccentricities both
mathematics and cycling? is this concreteindividual, necessarily rational and con-tingently two-legged or vice versa? Justinsofar as we are talking referentialiyf object, with no special bias toward
.. background grouping of mathematicians asagainst cyclists or vice versa, there is
no semblance of sense in rating some of
nis attributes as necessary and others as
contingent. Some of his attributes count
as important and others as unimportant,
yes; some as enduring and others asfleeting; but none as necessary or
contingent
.
It seems that Quine here has in mind the principles:
1)
Necessarily ( x ) (if x is a cyclist, x is two-legged)
and
2) Necessarily (x) (if x is a mathematician, x is rational)
These principles, it should be noted, provide an instantiation of
Spurious Essentialism. They hold that the properties being a
cyclis t, and bein£ two-legged
,
as well as the properties being a
and rational, are such that necessarily whatever
has the former also has the latter. However, these are innocuous
principles. io experience Quine’s sense of bewilderment we. must
comu.se them with their de re_ counterpart principles:
3) (x) (if x is a cyclist, x is necessarily tv/o-legged)
and
4) (x) (if x is a mathematician
,
x is necessarily rational)
But whereas (1) and (2) have a solid claim to truth, (3) and (4)
are clearly false. It is only by employing (3) and (4) in
conjunction with:
- 12 -
5) (x) (if X is a cyclist, x is not necessarily rational)
and
6> <X) (
“o-legged"'
athe!"atiCian> x iS nOC ^cessarily
that Quine’s objection strikes us as worthy. But again, if ( 5 ) and
(6) look at all attractive to an essentialist, it is only because
we confuse them with their de dicto counterparts that instantiate
Spurious Essentialism, i.e.:
7 ) - necessarily (x) (if x is a cyclist, x is rational)
and
8) - necessarily (x) (if x is a mathematician, x is
two-legged
)
while Spurious Essentialism may serve the useful purpose of
enabling us to understand Quine's objection to essentialism and to
avoid his bewilderment, we have seen that it is not rich enough to
capture Descartes’ essentialist doctrine. 14 We should move on,
then, to our survey of the available varieties. Next we consider:
-Trivia .i- Essentialism ; For every individual, x
there is some property, F, such that x necessarily
has F. y
This variety or essentialism is trivial in that there are
certain uninteresting, but universally instantiated, properties that
everything can be said to have necessarily. For example, nothing
could lack the property of being self-identical or of being either
red or non-red. Descartes’ essentialism clearly fits this variety,
though not in virtue of his countenancing such universally instan-
tiated properties as essential to their possessors. Rather, Descartes
- 13 -
held that all Substances in fact have one essential property, but
one such property only. Thinking belongs to mental substances,
extension to corporeal substances, and infinite perfection to God.
It is perhaps because ne thought substances to possess one essential
property only that Descartes conflates the notions of essence and
essential property
,
speaking at times of his essence being thinking
and at others of thinking being essential to him. If he had regarded
universal properties as essential to their owners, then Descartes
would have been saddled with an infinite number of essential
properties and a very inflated essence (if we regard a thing's
essence as’ being the sum of its essential properties).
It might be supposed that Descartes failed to regard universal
properties as essential, because he failed to recognize such
properties at all. But while it isn't clear what Descartes would
have thought of such putative properties as being such that 1+1-2
,
he at least recognized some properties that all things have and
have necessarily. Duration is an example. He says:
Finally the distinction of reason is between
substance and some one or its attributes without
which it is not possible that we should have a
distinct knowledge of it, or between two such
attributes of the same substance. This distinc-
tion is made manifest from the fact that we cannot
have a clear and distinct idea of such a sub-
stance if we exclude from it such an attribute;
or we cannot have a clear idea of the one of the
two attributes if we separate from it the other.
.For example, because there is no substance which
does not cease to exist when it ceases to endure
,
duration is only distinct from substance by
thought
„
.
This suggests that duration is an inseparable property of things.
Ir something ceases to have it, it ceases to exist. But Descartes
does not recognize duration to be an essential property of things
.
Elsewhere he treats existence similarly. It is a property every-
thing must have if it exists, but it is not an essential property
of anything (though necessary existence is a property of God). 15
So we cannot attribute to Descartes the principle:
S> If x has F necessarily, then x has F essentially
That is, we cannot conclude from a thing's having a property in
every world in which it exists that it has it essentially in
Descartes' sense. But we can attribute to Descartes the principle:
10
^ havfngr ~
essentially > then * cannot exist without
That is, if something is essentially F in Descartes' sense, then
it .is necessarily F. Descartes supports this view in Motes Directed
£agjBSLJ-£6£^n_PxograiiCTe when he replies to Regius' claim that the
mind may be a mode of corporeal substance. He says:
This assertion involves a contradiction, no
less than if he had said, f The laws of
nature allow that a mountain can exist with
or without a valley. 1 For a d?Lstinction must
be drawn between things which from their
nature can change, like the facts that I am
at present either writing or not writing, that
one man is prudent, another imprudent; and
things which never change, such as are all the
things that pertain to the essence of anything,
as is generally acknowledged by philosophers
.
Of course there is no doubt that it can' be
said of contingent things that the laws of
nature permit these things to be either one
way or another--for instance, the fact that
I am at present either writing or not writing
.
But when the point at issue is the essence of
something, it is manifestly foolish and
contradictory to say that the laws of nature
a.^low that it may be after any fashion save
the fashion after which it really is, 17
Descartes fails to distinguish here between the properties that
a thing has without which it could not exist and those that just
happen never to change for as long as the tiling exists. At any rate
the passage does support the view that a thing can’t lose its
essential properties while it continues to exist. Descartes affirms
(10) explicitly in reply to Arnauld when he says, "For in my opinion
nothing without which a thing can still exist is comprised in its
essence
. . .
,,ls
Descartes’ essentialism, of course, is less general than
Essentialism. He holds not only that everything has some
property necessarily, but also that everything is such that there
is some property that it has necessarily and there is something else
that fails to have it. That is, he holds the principle:
11) (x) (3P) (x necessarily has p & (By)-(y has P))
Doubtless
,
Descartes thought the world such that the second conjunct
of (11) holds accidentally. God could have made the world devoid of
bodies, for example, in which case the conjunct would be false. $o
we should not consider it part of Descartes’ notion of the essence
of a thing that everything is such that its essential property is
lacked by something else.
C. Arnauldic Essentialism ; For every individual, x,
there is a proper subset, F, of its non-universa!
properties which is such that (i) x has F neces-
sarily, and (ii) for every individual, y, y
necessarily has the property of being either non-F
or identical with x.
- 16-
Chisholm has offered a variant of Arnauldic Essentialism as being
required for identification of individuals across possible worlds.
He offers:
For every entity
,
x, there are certainproperties N and E such that: x has N insome possible worlds and x has non-N in
others; but x has £ in every possible
world m which x exists; and moreoverfor every entity, y, if y has E in anypoj^ible world, then y is identical withX
•
Arnauldic Essentialism has coma to be popular among present-day
essentialists
. Something very much akin to it has been espoused
by Alvin Plantinga.20 The subset F above (and E in Chisholm’s
version) seems to capture Scotus* notion of a haecceltas
. and the
associated property of having the properties in F has come to be
called a haecceitous property or individual essence. 21 it is a
view according to which if two things share the same essence, then
they are identical.
The distinguishing feature of Arnauldic Essentialism is that it
enables us to individuate things uniquely according to their essence
or haecceitous property. For that reason, Arnauldic Essentialism
cannot be Descartes*
. We have seen that for the latter not every-
thing shares the same essence, but still many things do. Created
substances divide up into two categories, thinking tilings and
corporeal things, each group with its own associated essential
property. This suggests that Descartes is interested in those pro-
perties in virtue of which a thing is the kind of thing it is
.
Everything
,
of course, fits into many different kind categories, so
- 1 ?-
it is not alone sufficient to explicate Descartes' notion of
essence by saying that it is related to kind properties, but it is a
step in the right direction. For Descartes' intellectual pre-
decessors, the scholastics, to ask for a thing's essence was to ask
What kind of thing it is, what properties it must have in order to
exist as that kind of thing. This too was Descartes* concern. For
him, as well as for the scholastics, a thing could not become a
thing of a kind different from what it is in fact. For that reason,
we are not talking about a version of Spurious Essentialism according
oo which pairs of properties are necessarily co-instantiated, but
which allows the possibility- of a thing's ceasing to have both
members of a given pair. Rather, Cartesian essentialism begins to
look like what we can label '/Aristotelian Essentialism'
.
~ :-P.ts 1i3n Essentialism : For every individual
x
,
there is a proper subset:, F, of its non-
universal properties which is such that x
necessarily has F.
Descartes r essentialism seems to be a variant of Aristotelian
Essentialism. For Descartes every individual substance has a
subset, one that is in fact a unit set, of its non-universal
properties, which it has essentially. But what subset? How do we
specify which of a thing r s non-universal properties is its essential
property? Descartes does not say. We know only that created
substances divide into those that are essentially thinking and those
that are essentially extended. But why divide them that way?
To answer our question it may be instructive to look at a
passage from C.D. Broad f s The Mind and its Place in Nature. In his
- 18 -
introductory chapter Broad set? out a view of substance and essence
that is very cj.ose to Descartes' own view. Broad introduces the
notion of a "differentiating attribute " that comes quite close to
Descartes* notion of an essential property. He says:
There are certain attributes which anything
must have if it is to be a substance at all
I should say that anything that is a sub-
stance; must have some duration and must be
capable of standing in causal relations
.
Or
since some people deny the reality of time
and or causation, let us say that anything
that is a substance must have those character-
istics
,
whatever they may be, which appear
to human minds as duration and causation. I
will call these "Substantial Attributes."
There are other attributes which a thing need
not have in order to be a substance. It
need not be extended and it need not even
appear to be so. Again, it need not have the
power of feeling or cognising, and it need
not even seem to have tnis
. .
.
.Now it must be
admitted that every actual substance must
have some special attribute or other beside
the substantial attributes which are essen-
tial to all substances. This special at-
tribute will make it a substance of such and
such a kind, e.g., a material or a mental
substance. Let us call suen attributes
"Differentiating Attributes." It will be
necessary to describe the nature of a dif-
ferentiating attribute a little more fully.
(1) It must not be essential to substance
as such, even if in fact it be possessed by
all substances. E.g., if materialism be
true, extension is an attribute which is in
fact possessed by all substances
.
But it
is a differentiating attribute for all that,
since it is not essential for a substance
as such to be extended. (2) It is a deter-
minable which is not itself a determinate under
any higher determinable. This condition is
needed for the following reason. Suppose that
the properties of being gold
,
being silver
,
and so on, are ultimate and irreducible. We
do not want to count these as differentiating
attributes: but, if we did not add the present
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condition, it is difficult to see why we
should not have to do so. But these
properties would be determinates under
the higher determinable "matter," and so
they will not have to be counted as
differentiating attributes if we add the
condition that such attributes must be
de terminable s of the highest order. 22
There are several important features of Broad's analysis
thot should be noticed. First, he is concerned to distinguish,
as Descartes t view apparently does, between those attributes that
are had universally by all substances (following common usage of
the notion, Broad regards these "substantial attributes" as
essential to substances) and the kind attributes that are not
necessarily had by all substances. In the former category he
places duration, as uescartes does, and in the latter category he
puts extension and thought. Broad's first condition on differen-
tiating attributes, that they are not essential to substances as
such, supports my claim that while Descartes thinks that the
essential attribute of a particular substance is not shared by all
substances, this is a result of the way God has made the world.
He might have made it differently. Broad* s point here is that it
is in virtue of being the kind of substance it is that a. particular
substance has the differentiating attributes that it has. Differen-
tiating attributes are not essential to substances qua substances,
but qu_a the kind of substance that they are.
The second condition, I think, is at the heart of Descartes 1
notion of an essential property. For him essential properties are
the defining properties of natural kinds of the highest level of
-21 -
belong to each of its parts. The other is that differentiating
attributes must be simple in that they cannot be analyzed into a
conjunction or disjunction of other properties
. Descartes cer-
tainly held the first of the above conditions to apply to corporeal
suds trances
. His view with respect to mental substances was that
they are not divisible into simpler or smaller parts. With regard
to the condition that differential attributes be simple
,
it is not
clear that Descartes was in agreement, at least as pertains to
thought. We shall discuss the question in the following section.
After explicating the notion of a differentiating attribute,
Brcao goes on to discuss how the notion can be used. He says;
A ’'Differentiating
-Attribute Monist" holds
thac there is in ract only one differentiating
attribute. Materialists, like Hobbes, and
Mentalis ts
,
3.ike Leibniz, are monists of this
kind. A "Differentiating-Attribute Pluralist"
holds that there are two or more differenti-
ating attributes. Pluralists of this kind
can be further subdivided according to two
different principles. (1) We may take the
trivial principle of dividing them according
to the number of differentiating attributes
they accept. E.g., Descartes was a dualist
and accepted two only:
... (2) A Much more
important principle of division is the fol-
lowing. Some people who accept a plurality
of differentiating attributes hold that one
and Che same substance can have several or
all of these attributes. Thus Spinoza held
that God has all the infinite number of dif-
ferentiating attributes
. Others consider the
various differentiating attributes to be
incompatible with each other. This view was
held by Descartes of the two differentiating
attributes which he accepted.. The first
kind of differenelating-attribute pluralist
can (though he 2‘ieed not) believe that there
is only one substance, as Spinoza did. The
second kind of differentiating-attribute
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generality into which individual substances car. be divided
. Bread
uses the determinable-determinate distinction to capture this
notion, and he expresses it by saying that there is no higher
determinable over a differentiating attribute. Broad should have
pointed out that there is one higher determinable over particular
differentiating attributes and that is the determinable "differen-
tiating attribute;" however, there are no others.
Unfortunately Broad’s account does not mesh entirely with
Descartes’, since the latter does recognize a higher determinable,
viz., "created substance." Had Descartes given thought to the
matter
,
he might have regarded the property having been created by
God as essential to created substances. But we can alternatively
view i.im as giving an account of the essence of created substance
only. If so, we can dismiss the property of having been created
by God ctnd say chat there are .no determinables higher than thought
and extension. The property having been created by. God would fail
tne fii s t conaitiori of differentiating attributes, since relative
to created substances it would be a universal property. Adoption
of this strategy also enables us to dismiss our previous worry about
how many of God’s properties are essential. If Descartes’ account
is intended to apply to created substances only, then there is no
inconsistency between his claim that every substance has one
essential property only and the view that God has many.
Parenthetically, I should point out that Broad offers two
additional conditions to characterize differentiating attributes.
One is thac a differentiating attribute of a complex substance must
-22 -
piuralis.t must admit at le
1(3 X'fcj
<
x, substance s as there
attributes
,
and lie mav cf
Descartes could not"~cons.is
less than two substances;
cepted a great many more,
that each individual mind
stance
ast as many dif-
are differentiating
course admit more,
tently have accepted
and in fact he ac-
since he thought
is a distinct sub-
I have introduced this passage from Broad so that we may keep in
mind his interpretation of Descartes 1 view as we proceed in the
following chapter to Descartes 1 arguments for the distinctness of
himself and his body and for the claim that his essence is thought.
We shouldn't at this juncture uncritically accept Broad's inter-
pretafion
,
but it is a strong candidate to consider. One of the
consequences of Broad’s view is that if Descartes can prove either
his claim that his essence is thought or his claim that he and his
body are distinct, then the other claim follows with the use of the
doctrine that differentiating attributes are incompatible with each
other. A difficulty for Descartes 1 adopting such a strategy to
establish his claims is that he seems not to have given argued
support to the view, if he in fact held it, that thought and exten-
sion are incompatible attributes. But more of this in later chapters.
Thinking
Descartes
far beyond the
word T thought
.
gave * cegitatio f and ’pensee* a sense that ex
sense that one ordinarily associates with the
When he gives lists of particular kinds cf
tended
English
thought
(he calls them ’ modi cogitandi *) Descartes lists many that we
would not normally include under the notion of thought. In
Meditation II he says:
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What is a thing which thinks? it is
a thing which doubts, understands, affirms
anrieels!^
5
’
refUSGS
’
Which filso
In a retter to Mersenne
,
who had objected that man has no will if
hi., nature consists only of thought, Descartes reminded him that
,Twilling, understanding, imagining and feeling are simply different
modes of thinking, which all belong to the soul.” 25
When he defines thought, Descartes appears to add a new dimen-
sion to the notion. He seems to claim that we are always conscious
of all of our thoughts
. In Arguments Drawn up in Geometrical
Fashion he says:
Thought is a word that covers everything that
exis cs in us in sucn a way that we are inimedi —
atsly conscious of it. Thus all the operations
cf the will, intellect, imagination, and of the
senses are thoughts. 26
It may appear here that Descartes is referring to the objects of
thought as that of which we are conscious, and not to our thoughts
themselves. However
,
the same definition appears in Principle IX.
which also clarifies the sense in which sensation is an activity
of the mind
;
By the word thought I understand all that of
which we are conscious as operating in us
,
And that is why not alone understanding, buu
also feeling, are here the same thing as
thought. For if I say I see, or I walk, I
therefore am, and if by seeing and walking I
mean the action of my eyes or my legs, which
is the work of my body, my conclusion is not
absolutely certain; because it may be that,
as often happens in sleep, I think I see or
1 walk
,
although I never open my eyes or move
from my place, and the same thing perhaps
might occur if I had not a body at all. But if
- 24-
I moan only to talk of my sensation or
my consciously seeming to see or toVaik
i.t oecomes quite true because my assertion
now refers only to my mind, which aloneis concerned with my feeling or thinking
that I see and I walk. 2;
When Descartes say5 that thought is that of which we are
conscious as operating in us, he seems to be referring not to what
we would call the object of a thought, but rather to what we would
regard as the activity of thinking. It is the activity, not the
object, of which Descartes seems to hold that we are conscious.
Kenny seems to share this interpretation of Descartes when he says:
. . .Doubting is one kind of thought; and
thought is defined precisely as~ "whatever
takes place within ourselves so that we
are conscious of it, in so far as it is
an object of our consciousness . ” There-
fore
,
"if X doubr 1 know that I doubt"
follows, for Descartes, from the definition
he has giyen of thought, of which doubting
is a species or mode
. We might say that
according to Descartes* definition, if we
wish to find whether a given verb 0, which
is applied to human beings
,
signifies a
kind of thought or not, we must ask "is
it true that when I 0 I know that I 0?"
Descartes therefore makes it true by
definition that if I think, I know that I
think . 28
Arnauld objected to Descartes* definition by drawing attention
to the fact that there may be much in the mind of which we are not
conscious. For example, the fetus possesses the faculty of thought
but is not conscious of it. Descartes replied by pointing out that
when he says there is nothing in the mind of which he is not conscious
he is referring not to the faculties but to active thoughts. He
says
:
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Can exist in us no thought of which,at thG very moment that it is present in uswe are not conscious. Wherefore I have no
’
«moVhat - th*: mdnd beglns to think at the
.own ume it is infused into the body of an
its ^t-h
* 15 'h9 Same time oonscious oft oughts, thougn afterwards it does notremember that, because specific forms of ?hesethougats do not live* in the memory. 29
The claim that we are conscious of all our thoughts has been
a source of difficulty for Descartes since it was first advanced.
Commentators seem to have regarded Descartes' primary definition
as having been given ostensively, or by example, thus opening to
objection his contention that we are always conscious of our
thoughts. The problem is that consciousness itself, being a mental
activity, would surely fall under Descartes' broad notion of thought.
But if my consciousness of some thought that I have is itself a
thougn;., then Descartes would seem bound to hold that I am in
turn conscious of my consciousness of my thought, and so on, ad
infinitum
,
The objection was first put by Hobbes
. In Objections III he
says
:
Moreover it is not by another thought that I
infer that I think; for though anyone may
think that he has thought (to think so is
precisely the same as remembering), yet we
cannot think that we are thinking, nor simi-
larly know that we know. For this would
entail the repetition of the question an
infinite number of times; whence do you
know, that you know, that you know, that
you know?-50
It is not clear exactly how Hobbes intends his objection to be read
.
He may intend a sort of epistemic regress that would seem to follow
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lf one answers the question "How do you know that
with one claim "I am conscious of my thinking."
you are thinking?"
that answer would
itself be open to query
} and so on. An alternative interpretation
of Hobbes* intent is to see him as offering the objection I
adumbrated above. The objection is that Descartes’ thesis gives
rise to an infinite regress:
Ue are aware of all of our thoughts.
b) An awareness of a thought is itself a
separate thought.
c) Assume : we are aware of some thought Tl,d) We are aware of T1 through a separate’
thought T2
.
e) T1 * T2.
f) Our awareness of T2 (call it *T3*) is
distinct from T2
.
g ) And so cn .
.
.
io avoid being committed to the regress Descartes would have
to deny (a) or (b). To deny (a) would be to give up his definition
of thought
,
so Descartes should deny (b). This seems to ba his
strategy in his reply to Hobbes. He says:
Again it is irrelevant to sav, as this
philosopher here does
,
that one thought
cannot be the subject of another thought.
Who. except my antagonist himself, ever
imagined that it could ?31
But to deny (b) while at the same time retaining (a), though Descartes
does not admit as much, seems to require one to hold that a thinker’s
thought and his awareness of that thought are one and the same act
or event. There is some evidence that Descartes thought this to be
the case. For example, he says that we are immediately conscious
of the thoughts that' we have ,^ If he means that we are simul-
taneously aware of our thoughts when we have them, then it; seems
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thaC 0Ur #WareneSS ° f given thought might be part of that thought
itself. One ordinarily thinks of the judgement that one has a
particular thought as being consequent upon and occurring after the
thought one judges oneself to have. But if such judgement occurs
simultaneously with the thought one has, then there would seem to
be a case for claiming them to consist in one and the same act.
Further, in a letter to Reneri, Descartes seems to either
confuse or intentionally identify the sensation of breathing with
the judgement that one is breathing. He says to Reneri:
When someone says ’I am breathing, therefore
I am 1 if he wants to prove he exists from thefact that there cannot be breathing without
*
existence, he proves nothing, because he would
have to prove first that it is true that he
is breathing, which is impossible unless he
has also proved that ne exists
. But if he
wants to prove his existence from the feeling
or opinion that he has that he is breathing/
so that he judges that even if the opinion
was untrue he could not have it if he did not
exist, then ids proof is sound. For in such
a case the thought of breathing is present
to our mind before the thought of our exist-
ing
,
and we cannot doubt that we have it
while we have it. 33
It is the judgement that occurs
,
consequent upon his having the
sensation of breathing, that would provide the premise for Descartes’
proof of his existence. But Descartes seems to suggest that the
feeling, or the strict sensation, could provide such a premise. It
is possible to interpret the passage as showing that Descartes thus
identified the feeling and the concommitant judgement. So it may be
that Descartes does consider a thought and the awareness of it to be
one and the same act or event.
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Anthony Kenny sees this as being a grave difficulty for
Descartes* view of mental activity. He says:
s h
f /Descartes/ had missed the point
° objection, *'ie must have meant that
a thought such as seeming to see was iden-
t
^
e aW3reness of seeming to see.But if this is so, then the consciousness
or a thought is no different from the
thought itselr and cannot be used by Des-
cartes as the mark that distinguishes
cogitative activities of human beings fromtheir corporeal activities. 34
Kenny here appears to think that Descartes regarded consciousness
as a mark or criterion of the mental. We saw above that he thought
such a view to follow from Descartes* definition of thought. That
is, if I am immediately conscious of /, then 0 is a thought or
mental event. Now it might appear, at first glance, that such a
putative criterion would be unreliable, given that I can be
conscious of my corporeal activities as well as my thoughts. But
that xs co overlook the importance of the distinction Descartes
provides between corporeal activities and the sensations of them.
Of the latter we are immediately conscious. With respect to the
foj.n>ex
,
if wq ace conscious of them at all, it is only derivatively
by inference i com our thoughts. So Kenny may be correct that con-
sciousness could be such a criterion.
However, if Descartes identifies a thought with his awareness
of that thought, then, Kenny thinks, he loses the criterial feature
of consciousness
. For his objection to carry weight, Kenny must
also hold that criteria are independent features of the things
for ’which they are criteria, features that are common to all and
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only those things
. So if our thoughts and our awarenesses of them
are identical, then awareness is not an independent feature that
accompanies all mental events and no physical events. So, Kenny
would say, Descartes cannot use consciousness as a criterion of
the mental.
At first glance it strikes one that Descartes did not intro-
duce Ids consciousness doctrine to provide a criterion for distin-
guishing between mental and non-mental acts or events, and so
Kenny’s objection is not a worthy one. Bur there is some evidence
that Descartes might have had such an intent. Or at least it
seems that he might have regarded as one value of his consciousness
doctrine its ability to provide such a criterion. After indicating
that thought covers everything in us of which we are immediately
conscious, Descartes says:
But I have added immediately
.
for the pur-
pose of excluding that" Which is a consequence
of our thought, for example
,
voluntary move-
ment, which, though indeed depending on
thought as on a causal principle, is yet it-
self not thought
.
J
5
And even if it is not Descartes’ intent to provide a criterion for
distinguishing between the mental and the non-mental
,
it is not
unreasonable to request such a criterion from him. His conscious-
ness doctrine, if it is successful, would possibly provide such a
criterion. We should, then, look for some way of salvaging Descartes
thesis that we are always aware of all of our thoughts
,
It might be thought: that asserting the identity of a thought
(e..g.
,
A) with cur awareness or it (here, B) is too radical a step
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t0 take ln avoidin
^ Hobbes* regress. Rather we can perhaps hold
that there is a necessary conjunction between A and the awareness
of it, E, so that the latter still serves as a mark of the presence
of the former, but is not identical with it. Also, in addition to
whatever else it is, A is also an awareness of B. That is, there is
a reciprocal relationship of awareness that holds between A and B;
each is an awareness of the other. Thus, all of our thoughts
would have a concommitant thought that would be an act of awareness
Ox that thought, but no thought would require, in virtue of Descartes*
consciousness doctrine, the existence of more than one other
thought. By this strategy we could retain our criterion of the
mental and avoid Hobbes* regress.
Unfortunately, employment of this strategy is precluded by
Descartes* insistence, in reply to Ilobbes, that one thought cannot
be the subject of another
. What is worse
,
even if Descartes were
to retract his claim, the suggested strategy would still fail.
To see why consider, for example, a sensation of pain, and suppose,
following Descartes, that I am aware of that sensation. The object
of my awareness is a certain painful sensation. But the object of
my sensation, if it can be said to have an object at all, is cer-
tainly not an awareness of a sensation of pain. It is, if anything,
a pain. So, having different objects, my sensation of pain and my
awareness of my awareness of my sensation of pain are distinct
entities. The strategy offered to save Descartes* criterion has
failed
.
It does not seem to me that Descartes can hold the view,
- 31 -
however important it might be to his ontological enterprise, that
consciousness is a criterion of the mental and at the same time
retain the view that we are aware of all our thoughts. But, what
is worse for him, neither does it seem that he can keep the latter
view and avoid Hobbes 1 regress by claiming the identity of our
thoughts with our awareness of them, even if he is willing to give
up the criterion of the mental. As I pointed out above, Descartes'
reply to Hobbes requires that every thought have as its object
either a thought that is an awareness or a thought that is an
awareness of an awareness
. But while some thoughts may have such
objects, surely not all do.
It seems, moreover, that the kind of awareness that Descartes
speaks of is a relational property. It is a relation between me and
my thoughts
. But surely not all of my thoughts are relations
between me and others of my thoughts. Surely some of them enable
me to make contact with the real world (hopefully), or at worst,
they connect me with a realm of Meinongian entities. But it does
not seem, contra the consequences of Descartes’ view, that I am
trapped in the circle of my own thoughts
.
Nov; it may be that Descartes’ view is not really damaged by
the objections that I, Hobbes, and others have raised against it.
Two considerations can be offered in defense of Descartes
.
In the
first place, it might be objected that I have stated the case
against Descartes misleadingly. It may seem that at least some of
our thoughts can have dual objects and that, for that very reason.
Descartes’ view does not at all trap us in the circle of our thoughts.
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It may be argued that if X am thinking of Christmas
,
for example
,
then my thought has as one of its objects, Christmas (or the idea
of Christmas, if you prefer), and it has as the other of its objects
my awareness of my thought of Christmas.
I am inclined to believe, however, that the dual-objects view
is an implausible one. On the view suggested for Descartes, every
thought would be at least an awareness of a thought. But it seems
that some thoughts have properties not had by awarenesses of
thoughts. Zeno Vendler has objected to the identification of
thinking with the judgement that one is thinking by claiming that
whereas the sensation of breathing can be painful, the judgement
that one is breathing cannot
.
3
3
This points up, I think, one
difference between some thoughts, in Descartes’ sense, and aware-
nesses of thoughts. For example, the thought of a personal mis-
fortune can be painful, but it is not clear that awarenesses of
thoughts can be painful, it is the thought of misfortune, not the
awareness or consciousness of that thought, that causes pain. Still
less would we be inclined to say that the awareness of the awareness
of the thought of misfortune is painful.
Similarly, as Descartes recognized, thoughts are sometimes
clear and distinct, and other times confused. But I can think of
no reason why he should have regarded the awareness of a thought as
confused. Certainly our memory of past thoughts is often confused,
but not present awarenesses. It seems, then, that at least some
thoughts have properties not had by awarenesses of thoughts. I can
be vividly aware of a very confused thought, but there is no reason
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to suppose that my awareness of my vivid awareness is also confused
So it seems that my awareness of my awareness of a thought of
Christmas
,
for example, is not
j.ne latter brings rne pleasure
j
identical with my thought of Christmas,
the former, when it exists, leaves
me unmoved. So, I am led to believe that the dual-objects strategy
for d voiding Hobbes’ regress is unsuccessful. But even if all such
strategies fail, Descartes can fall back on a second line of defense.
That defense lies in claiming that if his view does lead to a
Hobbesian regress, it is none the worse for doing so. A distinction
is sometimes made in philosophical discussions between vicious
and non
-vicious regresses, the former being pernicious and the
latter benign. Descartes * regress would fall into the non-vicious
category. No damaging consequence would accrue to Descartes’
theories as a result of allowing such a regress
. I take it that
Descartes’ commitment to the Hobbesian regress is objectionable only
in that we are not aware of there being an infinite chain of aware-
nesses that is associated with each thought we have. And that is
taken as evidence of there being no such regress
. But nothing
Descartes has said requires than we be aware of such regresses if
they in fact occur. It does not follow from our being aware of
each thought we have that we are also aware of having the sum total
of thoughts that we have
.
In addition, if Descartes’ defense against the Hobbesian
regress lies in his claim that one thought cannot be the object of
another, then even if the need for a criterion of the mental didn't
exist, Descartes would do well to retract his reply to Hobbes. He
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clearly elsewhere held its denial. For example, under some in-
terpretations, the Cojito passages require that Descartes be able
to think about others of his thoughts, tod under all interpreta-
tions known to me, the causal argument for the existence of God
requires that Descartes be able to entertain thoughts about his
thought of God.. 37
fncre are two other problems that arise for Descartes'
remarks about thinking. Neither is insurmountable. One stems
from passages in which Descartes seems to claim that the mind is
identical witn its thoughts. The other stems from passages in
which Descartes apparently affirms a claim that is counter to our
experience, at least when taken in conjunction with Descartes* claim
tnoi. we are always aware of our thoughts. Descartes seems to hold
that the mind is always thinking something. Thus, when Descartes
says that he .is essentially a thing that thinks, some have taken
him to have meant tnat r.e is essentially a thing that thinks all
the time. I shall deal with the former claim first.
Earlier in this chapter we characterized a Cartesian substance
as something that is over and above, or exists in addition to, the
properties that it instantiates. Thus, minds are something in
addition to their thoughts and bodies something in addition to their
physical properties. Unfortunately
,
some of Descartes' remarks seem
not to square with such a view of the mind. He says:
We may consider thought and extension as
constituting the natures of intelligent
and corporeal substance; and then they
must not be considered otherwise than as
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substances that think and areextended, i.e., as mmd and body.-38
It certainly seems that Descartes is here advocating a view of
substance that is at variance with the one X have previously at-
tributed to him. Kenny attempts to save my view (and his) by
pointing out that the nature of a substance, which Descartes says
is constituted by thought or extension, is different from substance
itself. 39 That is certainly the view we have been advocating,
but it just does not mesh with the remainder of Descartes’ above
remark. Nor is it compatible with a remark from the Interview with
Burmsn where Descartes says, "All the attributes taken together are
m truth the same thing as substance; but not the attributes taken
singly apart from the others. 40
Descartes here seams to be offering something like a Humean
bundle theory of the mind. But there are insuperable difficulties
witn his offering such a view. For example, Descartes held that
the identity of the body changed as it gained or lost parts. It
would seem, then, that if the mind is nothing in addition to its
tnoughts
,
then as one 1 s thoughts come and go, the identity of the
person changes. But there is nothing in his writings to suggest
that Descartes held such a view cr that he would accept such a view.
Indeed, in Principle LXIV, which immediately follows the troublesome
one, Descartes explicitly denies that the identity of a mental sub-
stance changes with its thoughts. He says:
We may likewise consider thought and exten-
sion as the modes which are found in sub-
stance j that is, in as far as we consider
that one and the same mind may have many
different thoughts
.
.
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A .so, Dc ^.artes definition of substance (given in reply to
2n£ ID as something in which properties reside would seem
to require that mental substances be something in addition to
Hume’s "congeries of perceptions." There is little doubt that
Descartes thought of himself as something that has thoughts rather
than as something that is identical, entirely or in part, with a
collection of thoughts
.
In his S^qops.is Q f the Meditations Descartes gives additional
support to tns view that the mind is a substance underlying its
thoughts and is not composed of them. He says:
. .
, tne human body, inasmuch as it differs
from other bodies, is composed only of a
certain configuration of members and of
other similar accidents, while the human
mind is not similarly composed of any
accidents, but is a pure substance. 4 ^
Further
,
in reply to Hobbes Descartes says:
Where I have said
,
this is the mind
,
the
spiri t, the intellect
,
or the re ason ~T~
understood by these names not merely
faculties, but rather what is endowed
with the faculty of thinking... 43
Again I do not assert that that which
understands and the activity of under-
standing are the same thing... 44
Somewhat later he says, ,T I do not deny that I, the thinker, am
distinct from my own thought, in the way in which a thing is dis-
tinct from its mode." 4 -’ For those who regard Descartes as having
believed himself to be identical with his mind, this reply serves
to provide yet more evidence that Descartes thought the mind
distinct from its thoughts. In general, I think we arc safe in
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conceding that the passage from Principe LXIII, however unable to
account for it we may be, does not represent Descartes' considered
view on the nature of mental substance.
other difficulty I want to discuss concerns the question
of how we are to interpret Descartes' claim that he is essentially
4
—
thir'9- Thae is, “hat does Descartes mean when he says
that something is a thing that thinks? The more natural way to view
Descartes' pronouncement about himself would be to regard him as
holding that he nas the capacity or power to think. However,
apparently most commentators have interpreted him as asserting
that he is always in the process of thinking
. Anthony Kenny
,
for
example, purports to be speaking for Descartes when he says,
"Tnought is the essence of mind in the sense that each mind must
always be thinking some thought or other, but particular thoughts
come and go and none of them is essential ."45 ;,nd again> „ fls long
“ i exist, Descartes believed, the proposition 'coqito ' is true of
me; the particular cogitationes that make it true vary from
moment to moment, from dim prenatal pleasures to metaphysical
meditations 47
Tnat Descartes held the view attributed, to him is supported by
a letter to Gibieuf
. He says;
I believe that the soul is always thinking
for the same reason I believe that light
is always shining, even though there are
not always eyes looking at it, and that
heat is always warm though no one is being
v,'armed by it, and that body or extended
substance always has extension, and in
general that whatever constitutes the nature
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of a thing always belongs to it as Iona
c=s it exists
. So it would be easierfor me to believe that the soul ceased to
times when it is supposed tocease lo think than to conceive that it
could exist without thought
.
48
Ana in reply to Gassendi he says;
You have a difficulty, however, you sav
as to whether I think that the soul alwaysthinks
. But why should it not always
think
,
when it is a thinking substance ?48
A good hypothesis to account for Descartes 1 having held such
a counter-intuitive view, if he did, would be that he either
confused, or failed to recognize, the distinction between occurrent
and dispositional properties
.
50
Since he held the view that
substances must have their essential property if they are to exist
at dll, then if he failed to distinguish between the property of
actively thinking particular thoughts and the property of having
the capacity to think, we can see why Descartes might have believed
that minds are constantly in the process of entertaining thoughts.
It seems that if Descartes had recognized the dispositional
property of having the capacity to think, he would not have had
reason to claim that he is always thinking. Apparently, though,
when Descartes says "I am essentially a thinking thing” he means
not that he is a being who has the capacity to think, but that he
is a being who is always thinking
.
He even moves, in a letter to
Gibieuf
,
to defend his view against the obvious objection that it
doesn’t seem to us that we are always thinking. He says:
And I do not see any difficulty here, except
that people think it superfluous to believe
- 39-
that
-1C 4the sou~7 thinks at times when nomemory or the thought remains with us after
-
wares. But consider that every night wehave a thousand thoughts, and even while
awo^e we had a thousand thoughts within thehour of which no trace remains in our memory
and wmch seem no more use than thoughts ’
v;e may have had before we were born.” Thenyou will find it easier to be convinced of
my theory than to judge that a substance
whose nature is tc think can exist while
not thinking at all. bl
Descartes is here guilty of the fallacy of false alternatives.
He seems to think that if something is essentially a thinking thing,
then it either thinks all the time or ceases to exist while not
thinking. But that is to overlook the alternative according to
which the existence of essentially thinking tilings is sustained by
their property of having the capacity to think. In addition to
committing the fallacy of false alternatives, Descartes has failed
to answer adequately the objection he set himself to answer. It
just seems plainly false to claim that the person who has been
unconscious
,
or the person who has been awakened from deep sleep,
instantaneously forgets what he was thinking, but that he was
nonetheless thinking and that he was at the time conscious of his
thoughts. Admittedly
,
there is nothing inconsistent in Descartes'
view, but it is painfully counter-intuitive, at variance with what
we take to be the case
,
and to be avoided if at all possible
.
There is, of course, a respectable alternative view. That is
to regard man as having the capacity to chink or as having the
faculty of thought. Now it may have been that Descartes was led
to his view by epistemological or -metaphysical considerations that
to have the
he thought persuasive
. For example, if persons fail
property of corporeality, or fail to have it essentially, then they
can be known only by their thoughts. They are possibly without any
other properties, except existence and duration. But knowing only
that a thing has existence and duration seems not sufficient to
guarantee our epistemological access to that thing. We know a
substance by its properties, Descartes tells us, and it might have
seemed to him that if a substance didn't manifest some non-universal
properties, then there is nothing we could know about it. For
better or worse, that is the epistemological consideration that
might have motivated Descartes. He might also have been moved
by the metaphysical consideration that universal properties alone
are not sufficient to sustain the existence of a thing. That, we
know from our previous discussion, he believed. And it might have
seemed to him that the active exemplification of "differentiating
attributes” was required for the existence of a thing.
It seems to me, however, that these considerations
,
if they
did in fact motivate Descartes, should not have. They are not
compelling
. Regarding the metaphysical consideration first, even
if we accept tne view that a substance must have some non
-universal
properties in order to exist, there is no reason that we should
require them to be non -dispositional properties. The property of
having the capacity to think, or the faculty of thought, should serve
equally well to sustain individual mental substances. There is
no reason to fear the possibility of such a substance passing out
of existence when it ceases to have occurrent properties. If it
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makos sense to think of a non-material substance at all, then
there is no reason why one non-material, non-universal property
rather than another shouldn’t characterize it.
With regard to the epistemological consideration that might
have motivated Descartes’ view, there again seems to be nothing
that compels Descartes to require that constant occurrent proper-
ties characterize mental substance. To the extent that we have
any access to the mental properties of a substance distinct from
ourselves, there is no reason to suppose that we have better access
in the case of occurrent properties over dispositional properties
.
In our own case it may be thought that Descartes required an
unbroken chain of consciousness to guarantee our beliefs about
self-identity. He may have thought that if there were moments when
we ceased to think, and so ceased to be conscious of ourselves
thinking
,
then we could not be sure after we had resumed thinking
that we were the same mental substance that had existed a few
moments before
.
However, that is a problem about the reliability of memory
and the truth of clear and distinct perceptions. It is well known
that Descartes thought himself capable of solving that problem.
Further, the problem is no greater when there are momentary lapses
of consciousness than when there is an unbroken chain of consciousness
.
In both cases we must rely upon the accuracy of our memory of there
being prior acts of consciousness
.
1 think, then, that there is no reason for Descartes to have
required that mental substances be constantly in the process of
~*J2-
thiriking some thought or other. And it is not entirely clear
that he m fact imposed that requirement. To Hobbes he said:
. . .Walking is usually held to refer only tothdt action itself, while thinking applies
now to the action, now to the faculty of
thinking, and again to that in which thefaculty exists.
Descartes several places speaks of the faculty of understanding and
distinguishes between it and the mind. 53 it is tantalizing to
suppose chat when he says ”1 am essentially a thinking thing”
Descartes intends "I am essentially a thing that has the faculty
(or capacity) of thought.” There is insufficient evidence to
ascribe that view to Descartes, but I hope I have shown that there
is no reason why he shouldn T t have held it.
Having armed ourselves now with a passable understanding of
Descartes’ technical notions, we are ready to wade into his argu-
ments for the non -identity of himself and his body and for his
essence being thought.
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CHAPTER II
After establishing the certainty of his existence, Descartes
proceeds to investigate the nature of: the thing whose existence is
^h.„t investigation results in the issuance of two claims
ly Descartes; one, that his essence is thinking; the other, that
he is nee identical with his body. Our concern is to discover
Descartes* arguments for the latter conclusion, though in doing so
we will need tc investigate his attempt to establish the former-
claim.
The Argument from Doubt
We can begin by looking first at an argument often derided by
Descartes* commentators and generally taken to be his primary
argument for the distinctness of himself and his body. The argu-
ment is suggested in the following passage from Part IV of the
Discours e
;
I considered attentively what I was; and I
saw that while I could feign that I had no
body, that there was no world, and no piece
for me to be in, I could not feign that I
was not; on the contrary from the mere fact
that I thought of doubting about other truths
it evidently and certainly followed that I
existed. ...From this I recognized that I was
a substance whose whole essence or nature is
to be conscious and whose being requires nc
place and depends on no material, thing. 1
The argument I have in mind (call it the 1 Argument from Doubt-
gets a clearer statement in The Search After Truth when Folyander
says that he is not a body, for otherwise, doubting of his body
he should at the same time doubt of himself, and this he cannot do
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Arnauld
,
probably wrongly, thought that the Argument from Doubt
W5S present in th8 5econd Meditation. He summarizes it as follows:
I airs able to doubt whether I have a body
nay, whether any body exists at all; yet
I have no right to doubt whether I am or
exist, so long as I doubt or think.
Hence j.
,
who doubt and think
v
am not a
oody; otherwise in entertaining doubt con-
cerning body
,
1 should doubt about myself.
3
We can reconstruct the argument as follows:
1) I can doubt that my body exists
2) 1 cannot doubt that I exist
3)
I am not identical with my body.
In the Discourse Descartes spoke not of doubting his body to exist,
but rather of his being able to feign that it does not: exist. That
suggests an alternative version of the argument that we can
reconstruct as follows:
1*) I can feign that my body does not exist,
2
l
1 cannot feign that I do not exist.
3* ) I am not identical with my body.
The two arguments are closely similar in form, so we shall concen-
trate on the former, more popular version. Reconstructed either
way, the Argument from Doubt has its faults, and the commentators
purport to have exposed them.
Norman Malcolm, for example, proposes to demonstrate the
argument’s invalidity by constructing "arguments of parallel form
that are plainly invalid." He offers three. Unfortunately, none
has the same form as the Argument from Doubt and so cannot demon-
strate the latter’s invalidity. 4 Malcolm’s first counter-argument
is:
-49 -
f? J
can doubt: that I am a Grand Master of Elk-PJ_ I cannot doubt that I exist.
c ) 1 am not a Grand Master of Elks.
(A) has roughly the form;
a f ) 1 can doubt that Fa.
b t ) I cannot doubt that Ga.
cTy
-Fa
or possibly;
a") Fa
b") K3a
c")
-Ha
whereas the Argument from Doubt has the form;
1") I can doubt that Fa.
2") 1 cannot doubt that Fb
3 fr) a :JT“"
' or possibly;
l ,ft ) Fa
2**»)
-FbPTTT? b
Clearly, the form of Malcolm* s first putative counter
-argument fails
to parallel that of the Argument from Doubt. It can be brought
closer into line by changing Malcolm* s argument to;
A*, a) I can doubt that the Grand Master of Elks exists
bj I cannot doubt that I exist.
c) I ?“the Grand Master of Elks.
This same form is exhibited by Malcolm's second argument;
3. a) I cannot doubt that Bertrand Russell exists.
b) I can doubt that the author of "Why I Am Not a
—
Christian " exists
.
c) Bertrand' Russell y- the author of "Why I Am Not a
Christian."
Both (A*) and (3) approximate the form of the 7-irgument from Doubt.
They differ in that they unlike the latter, contain a definite
- 50 -
description, which, if given 3 Russellian treatment, precludes the
desired parallelism. It might bt thought that there is no real
difference between the Argument from Doubt and Malcolm's (A> ) and
(B), since <my body’ in the former must be understood as short
for ’the body that is mine' or some such description. That being
so
9 it would bo objected + herp it an Q
v
,
>
- e J- s an exact parallel between the
arguments. However, the objection is mistaken.
We have at least two versions of the Argument from Doubt under
consideration. One has as its first premise *1 can doubt that my
body odists
,
1 and the other has »I can feign that my body doesn’t
exist Also we have two alternative ways of treating ’my body.*
We can regard it as a proper name, one whose referent gers specified
m the context in which it appears. Or, we can regard it as short
ror a definite description. Whichever treatment of f my body* we
elect 00 employ, it should work in both versions of the Argument
from Doubt. Only one does.
If we regard the expression as short for a definite descrip-
tion, then there is no problem, with the sentence *1 can doubt
that my body exists* if we read it as *1 can doubt that there
exists something
,
x, such that x is a body of mine and anything
that is a body of mine is identical with x*
, However, the sentence
*1 can feign that my body doesn*t exist,* under the definite
description treatment, becomes *1 can feign that there exists
something
,
x
,
such that x is a body of mine and anything that is a
body of mine is identical with x and x. doesn*t exist. The sentence
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Wh°°e trutn 1 am sa3*a ro able t0 feigri is a contradiction, but
it seems doubtful that I could in fact feign the truth of a
contradiction. Thus, the locution 'my body' in the Argument from
Doubt must be regarded as being like an individual constant, not
like a definite description. Malcolm's counter
-argument then,
fails to exhibit the needed form. 5
To produce an argument that parallels the Argument from Doubt,
Malcolm should have used an argument like;
d) I can doubt that Mark Twain exists.
-
1 cannot doubt that Samuel Clemens exists
f) Mark Twain ^ Samuel Clemens
Thei e are imaginable circumstances under which someone could
doubt the truth of the proposition that Mark Twain exists, but not
the proposition that Samuel Clemens exists. Thus, Descartes'
argument is invalid, and the possible truth of the premises and
falsity of the conclusion in the above argument demonstrates that
fact.
Malcolm also attempts to persuade us of the failure of Descartes'
argument by producing a similar argument with a conclusion unaccept-
able to Descartes. He offers:
g) I can doubt that there exists a being whose
essential nature is to think.
h) I cannot doubt that I exist.
rr I am not a being whose essential nature is to think.
This too lacks the form of the Argument from Doubt. But even if it
had the correct form, it is not clear that the argument would be
troublesome to Descartes
,
since there is some reason to suppose that
he would reject the first premise.
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On more than one occasion Descartes claims that he clearly and
distinctly perceives that his essence is to think. He holds too
that clear and distinct perceptions, while being attended to, are
not capable of being doubted. In assessing the truth of (g)
Descar ces might be drawn to consider the argument:
j) I am a being whose essential nature is to thinkk) I exist
.
XT’ There exists a being whose essential nature is totniuK
«
Further, Descartes would probably have held that he clearly and
distinctly perceives the conclusion, since he clearly and distinctly
perceived the premises and the inference from the premises to the
conclusion. That being so, Descartes, when attending to (g),
may refuse to grant that he can doubt the existence of such a
being, since he clearly and distinctly perceives (1). it is not
sufficient for Malcolm* s purpose to show that an argument is
constructible that both has the form of the Argument from Doubt
and would be troublesome to Descartes if he accepted the premises.
He must find one whose premises Descartes would in fact accept.
Even if Malcolm* s strategy of counter-argument can be made
successful, as it appears that it can, we would still like to know
exactly where the Argument from Doubt goes wrong. Anthony Kenny
has attempted to expose its weakness. He notes that the move
from (1) and (2) to (3) in our version depends upon the Principle
of the Indiseernibility of Identicals. If that is correct, the
argument* s formal structure looks like this:
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4 ) r-'b
5) -Fs
H M (y) ((x=y)s»(Fx=Fy))/) (b=s )•=* (FbsFs
)
g)_. ;-(Pb=Fs )
9) ~(b=s
)
Kerry’s objection is that the principle here used (i.e
., (6), call
rt Leibniz 1 Law 1 ) has a restricted range of application, in
particular we are enjoined by the existence of counter-examples
from applying it in modal and intentional contexts. What makes its
use not available to Descartes is that (1) and (2) provide a
context that is both modal and intentional. So, Kenny says, the
argument is to be rejected as needing a principle not applicable
to itb premises; or, as some would say, a false principle.
Many philosophers remain unconvinced that modal and intentional
contexts yield counter-examples to Leibniz 1 Law. 6 For them, Kenny 1 s
objection to the Argument from Doubt is neither welcome nor con-
v_iTk. ing
. Rue we should find Kenny 1 s objection unconvincing
irrespective of our feeling about the range of applicability of
Leibniz 1 Law. It is unconvincing, because in the argument we have
constructed the principle is not applied to contexts bound by so-
called opacity inducing operators. Filled out, the Argument from
Doubt goes as follows:
1) I can doubt that my body exists.
2) I cannot doubt that I exist.
10) My body has the property of being possibly doubted
by me to exist.
11) I do not have che property of being possibly
doubted by me to exist.
12) (x) (y) ( (x=y ) ^> ( Fx=Fy )
)
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Kay
> then "V body hashaing possibly doubted by ,Z to
f
na only it I have that property
w??biv 2°5 Z~’ ha5 tft® pooperty of' being
re-r
—
gosstbl doubted by me to exist.
I am not identical with my body]
We can see that Leibniz* Law is applied not to (1) and (2), as
Kenny 1 s objection suggests, but rather to (10) and (11), contexts
that are purely extenstonal. Kenny»s objection does not hold;
he has failed to show us what is wrong with the Argument from Doubt
Fortunately, we need not look far to see where the real fault
lies. To see where the argument goes wrong, it is helpful to
suppose for a moment that Descartes offered a truncated version of
the Argument from Doubt, one like our version except with premises
(1) and (2) omitted. How should we assess such an argument:
It is valid, but we must question the truth of its first two
premises ((10) and (11) in our version). What is Descartes*
justification for offering them? If he is entertaining the
possibility at this juncture that he is identical v/ith his body
then he is not warranted in merely asserting, without proof, that
something is true of the one but not the other. That claim requires
argued support, and what Descartes has available is the fact,
represented by (1) and (2), that he is able to conceive the truth
of the proposition that Ms body does not exist but unable to con-
ceive the truth of the proposition that he does not exist. That,
however, is not sufficient. The fact that Descartes doubts that
nis body exists and the fact that he does not doubt that he exists
do not yield the de re truth that his body has a property not had
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by him, that of being doubted to exist.
If „r„ hav^ correctly represented his seasoning, Descartes 1
error lies in the
to (10) and (11),
move fro5a C 1 ) and (2), his only stated premises,
premises required to get the desired conclusion
by application of Leibniz* Law. The inference from (1) and (2) to
(10) and (11), from de dieto propositions to their de re counter-
parts (call this inference Exportation*), is not warranted. 7 To see
thav. it is not, suppose that I am attempting to discover whether
John is Tom*s father. I reason as follows. X can doubt that John
has ever been fertile, so John has the property of being possibly
doubted by me to have ever been fertile. I cannot doubt that
TornE father has ever been fertile, so Tora*s father does not have
the property of being possibly doubted by me to have ever been,
fertile. Since John has a property not had by Tom’s father, the
two are distinct. Obviously, the argument is invalid. Leibniz*
Law is not suspect, so the fault must lie in the move from a de
proposition to a de proposition. Descartes* procedure is
similar to the above. He infers from its being possible for Mm
to doubt that his body exists and its not being possible for Mm
to doubt that he exists that Ms body has a property he does not
have, that of being possibly doubted to exist. Eut, as we have
seen, that is not a warranted inference. The Argument from Doubt
do«ss not work.
Now it may be thought that there are circumstances under which
exportation is allowable. It can be argued that all I have shown
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With v counte^-example is that exportation as a principle of
inference is not universally applicable
,
but that there are cases
,
Descartes' possibly being one, in which exportation is permissible.
For example, my believing true the proposition the tallest sov is
£££ d&; ' E not by itself warrant the- claim that I believe of
Jones, who happens to be the tallest spy, that he is a spy. But,
one might argue, I am sufficiently well acquainted with my body and
with myself to be warranted in claiming that I have de re beliefs
with respect to them that I have inferred from my de dicto beliefs
iri which they play a role. For example, X can infer from;
16)
I believe that 1 am writing.
the d(5 re proposition:
17) I believe of myself that I am writing.
In general, one may argue, where the de re belief is about the
believer (let us call such a belief a , first person belief f ), it is
one that can be inferred with warrant from a de dicto proposition.
In reply to the objection, I must admit that I am sympathetic
to the claim that first person beliefs are such as to be inferable
from 4®. propositions, though, 1 should add, only where the de
dicto proposition has a certain indexical feature
,
that is
,
only
where the believer *s statement of the believed proposition contains
an indexical expression, that refers to himself. For example, where-
as it is permissible for me to infer (17) from (16), it is not
permissible for mo to infer:
18) 1 believe of the youngest resident of Oak Street
that lie is writing.
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(where I happen to he that person) from*
I heiNeve that the youngest resident of Oakstreet as writing.
In the latter case we must at least add che requirement that I
know that I art the youngest resident of Oak Street.
Descartes 1 case, of course, is an inference of the former
sort, and it would appear to be sanctionable. But 1 think it is
not. At least, not entirely. Someone might object to the
inference in Descartes » case with the claim that his is a special
case. It is special in that the very issue he is trying to settle,
i.e., the nature of his relation to his body, is one about which
he ought to be clear before he can be said to have an adequate
acquaintance with the objects of which he is said in (10) and (11)
to hove beliefs. That is, if he is trying to determine, and
doesn f t yet know, whether he is identical with his body, then he
cannot be sure that in doubting that his body exists he does not
also doubt, in an oblique fashion (or under a different description
of himself) that he exists. So, the argument goes, Descartes is
not warranted in exporting from (1) and (2) to (10) and (11); he
does not have the requisite acquaintance with himself and his body
to make the inference in this case.
The argument is appealing, but I think it is only half right.
I want to claim that Descartes would be warranted in inferring
(10) from (1), but not (11) from (2). Indeed, it seems dubious that
it is ever the case than an inference of:
20) It is not the case that I believe of x that it is F.
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from:
21) It is not the ease that I believe that x is F.
is permissible. That is, I deny the allowability of exportation
fr0iTl che denial of a de dicto belief statement to the denial of a
de re belief. Certainly such inferences, conjoined with inferences
from such statements as:
22) I believe that x is F.
to:
23) I believe of x that it is F.
lead to trouble. For example, suppose that I am witness to a bank
robbery by the Masked Bandit. I'm in the bank, I watch him empty
the cash drawers, hear him order the customers and tellers about,
etc. In such a case, I would be warranted in inferring:
24) I believe of the Masked Bandit that he is a
bank robber
.
from:
25) I believe that the Masked Bandit is a bank robber. 8
And suppose further that my neighbor, unbeknownst to me, is in fact
the Masked Bandit, though I regard him as a paragon of virtue and
the last person I would suspect of wrongdoing. In this case it
would be acceptable to infer:
26) I believe of my neighbor that he is not a
bank robber
.
from;
27) 1 believe that my neighbor is not a bank robber.
Given the truth of:
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28)
and the fact
My neighbor = the Masked Bandit
that (24) provides a context in which »the Masked
Bandit' occurs extensionally, we can infer- from (24) and (28):
29) I Believe of icy neighbor chat he is a bank robber,
tod we could conjoin (27) and (29) to get:
30 ) I believe of my neighbor that he is a bank
robber and that he is not a bank robber
.
(30) is not inconsistent. It is, in fact, true, though it arises
from ray believing propositions that are inconsistent with each
other
. Kotice that (30) is to be distinguished from:
31)
I believe that my neighbor is a bank robber
and not a bank robber.
(ol) is an inconsistent belief. Presumably rational agents do not
hold beliefs like (31), though they do, unfortunately, often hold
beliefs that are mutually inconsistent (in this case, (25) and (27)).
But notice that both (30) and (31) are to be distinguished from;
32)
It is the case that I believe of my neighbor
that he is a bank robber and it is not the
case that I believe of my neighbor that he
is a bank robber.
(32) is a straightforward contradiction; unlike (30), there are no
circumstances under which it is true. But we will be saddled with
statements like (32) if we allow exportation both from belief
statements and from the denials of belief statements (i.e., from
statements like (2) in the Argument from Doubt). For example
,
if
in the above situation I infer:
33)
It is not the case that I believe of my
neighbor that he is a bank robber.
-6o~
from the true statement;
34) It is not the case that I believe that
my neighbor is a bank robber.
then (33) will be inconsistent with (23). which is also a true
statement. In short, allowing exportation in the case of both
affirmations and denials of de ditto belief statements opens the
way to a plethora of contradictions
.
It seems apparent, then, that if we are going to allow expor-
tation in belief contexts, we ought not to allow it with respect
to both the affirmation and the denial of belief statements, it
seems, moreover, that we do hold de re beliefs and that there are
occasions on which it may be useful or desirable to export from
—
dj-ffrq to £i beliefs . So it seems that since we cannot allow
exportation in both cases, we should allow its use in the appro-
priate affirmative cases and proscribe its use in all cases of the
denial of a de dieto belief.
At any rate, it is certain that if exportation is ever allow-
able in the case of the denial of a belief, it is at least not so
allowable in Descartes ? case, i.e., in the move from (2) to (11).
In the context in which the Argument from Doubt appears, Descartes
must grant that it may turn out that he does indeed doubt of him-
self that he exists when he doubts of Ms body that it exists. It
would turn out that way if, unbeknownst to him but conceded by him
to be possible, he was identical with his body, I conclude, then,
that the Argument from Doubt is invalid; it relies upon a rule of
inference whose application is not warranted in the context in which
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it is applied. If Descartes offered the Argument from Doubt, he
shouldn’t have.
There are reasons, however, to question the imputation to
Descartes of the Argument from Doubt. There are two reasons, a good
one and a bad one. The bad one, which is based on a principle of
charity, goes as follows. While exportation is sometimes permissible
in affirmative belief contexts
,
there are some such contexts that
never allow it. Two of them are 'believe that x does not exist'
and 'doubt that x exists.' That is, one can never export from
statements like;
35) S doubts that x exists.
and
36) 8 believes that x doesn’t exist,
to statements like:
37) S doubts of x that it exists.
and
38)
S believes of x that it doesn’t exist.
(35) and (36) do not allow exportation, since if S’s doubt is
justified, then he has no reason to believe that there exists any-
thing of which he can doubt that it exists or believe that it
doesn’t, ard if his belief is true, then there is in fact nothing of
which he doubts and believes. Further, if he has reason to believe
that there is something of which he can doubt and believe, then his
doubt and belief are unjustified. It seems that there is at best a
sort of pragmatic inconsistency in the de re versions of (35) and (36).
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If there is something for S to believe and doubt about, and if- he
is sufficiently well acquainted with it to allow exportation, then
he shouldn't hold the beliefs and doubts that ha does. But if
there is nothing to believe and doubt about, then exportation
fails. So it seems that contexts provided by the locutions
'believe that x doesn't exist* and 'doubt that x exists* arc contexts
that never allow exportation. The Argument from Doubt, the
reasoning goes, since it involves the latter construction, obviously
fails to get off the ground. So, on charity alone, it should not
be imputed to Descartes
.
I think it true that there is something odd about the construc-
tions in question, and X am inclined to agree that exportation should
not be allowed in contexts created by them. However
,
that is not a
difficulty for the Argument from Doubt, since it employs neither
construction. In one of our two versions Descartes says that he is
to doubt that his body exists, not that he does in fact so
doubt (though for other purposes he doss so doubt). In the other
version he says that he feigns that his body does not exist. There
seems little doubt that the locution 'feign that x does not exist*
provides a context that is not closed to exportation on threat of
something like pragmatic inconsistency. It is a common occurrence
for us to feign, in a counter-factual frame of mind, that something
with which we are familiar decs not exist. We imagine v?hat the
world would be like without it.
Admittedly, it is more open to question whether the context
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provided by the locution ’able to doubt that x exists* is one from
whicn we can export. The locution in question seems to have two
interpretations. On one, ’able to doubt that x exists’ can ba
explicated as saying that there is a possible world, or imaginable
counter
-factual situation, in which it would not be pragmatically
inconsistent to doubt that x exists. On this interpretation
exportation is permissible. It would not, of course, be permiss-
ible in the imagined counter
-factual situation, but we are not in
that situation
. We are in one in which x_ does in fact exist. On
the other interpretation the locution says that the present
situation or actual world is such that it is not pragmatically in-
consistent to doubt that x exists. This interpretation would not
accommodate exportation. I have no strong opinion regarding the
correct interpretation, but it is open to a proponent of the
Argument from Doubt to opt for the former. On it, it is true that
I can doubt that my body exists but not that I exist. V?e can see,
then, that neither version of ths Argument from Doubt is open to
the present objection. It is a bad one.
The other reason for withholding ascription of the argument to
Descartes is a good one. It stems from the context in which
Descartes is purported to have offered the argument. As we saw above,
if we are to export from (1), then ’my body’ must be referential;
it must refer to something that exists. ' But when Descartes is in-
vestigating the nature of himself, he does not yet know whether he
has a body, or even that there are any material objects at all.
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h fotjliori, he does not know that 'my body' refers to anything. The
Argument fro* itoubt, expressed as it is, has as a consequence:
39) (3x)(x = Descartes’ body)
But at t’ne juncture at which he is thought to have offered the
argument, Descartes would not recognize (39) as true. And so, we
suppose, he would not have offered an argument with (39) as a con-
sequence. This
,
I think, is a good reason for withholding ascrip-
tion of the Argument from Doubt to Descartes. But then we must
seek an alternative interpretation for the passages from which
the argument is derived. We should look for an interpretation
that has no consequences that go beyond what Descartes knew at the
juncture at which the passages occur.
One minor revision of the argument comes to mind. We could
attempt to express the first premise hypothetically so as not to
commit ourselves to the existence of Descartes 1 body. We could uses
40) If I have a body, it is such that I can
doubt that it exists.
However, (40) won’t give us:
41) My body is such that if I have it, I can
doubt that it exists
.
and something like (41) is what we would need to employ Leibniz 1 Law,
which is necessary to get the conclusion that we desire. To derive
(41) we would need an existential quantifier in front of (40), but
that would reintroduce the difficulty that led us to abandon the
Argument from Doubt. I am in general inclined to doubt that any
non-question-begging version of Descartes 1 argument can be constructed
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unless it .is one that does not make use of Leibniz 5 Law.
Conceivobility
It would seem best to give up the attempt to construct an
argument that relies on Leibniz 5 Law. if we go back to the texts,
we can find evidence that Descartes had a different argument in
ra“tla ‘ fourth set of objections
,
when Arnauld summarizes
Descartes 5 argument from Meditation II, he expresses the first
premise by saying that he is able to doubt whether he has a body.
There is an important difference between the statement 5 1 can doubt
that my body exists 5 and 5 1 can doubt whether I have a body. 5 The
former* tends to suggest that I have a bodyj the latter is neutral
on the question. Descartes most often expresses himself in the
fashion of the latter. Moreover, he often grants that while he is
sure that he exists, lie- finds no difficulty in supposing the world
to be devoid of objects
.
From that he is led to conclude that he
is not a body. The evidence suggests that Descartes has in mind an
argument like:
42) I can conceive of myself existing and no
bodies existing.
4TTXa^not a body.
P.s it stands, the argument is shamefully enthymemafcic
;
we should
attempt to make it respectable by adding soma premises. Descartes
gives no hint as to how it is to be filled out, but if it is his
argument, we should be careful to supply only premises that would
]& acceptable to him.
As an initial step toward lending respectability, we can appeal
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t0 the Huaean aoctrine that what is not possible is not conceivable,
that is i
44) t> is conceivable, is possible) 9
Applied to our first premise, the principle sllov/s us to conclude;
45) It is possible that I exist and no bodies
exist.
Mow the problem is to get from its being possible that Descartes
is not a body to the conclusion that he is in fact not one.
Obviously the move would be an easy one if we had available a
principle to the effect that if something is a body then it is not
possibly not one. We could then construct the following argument:
42) I can conceive of myself existing and no
bodies existing.
44) (£>( if g> is conceivable, then p is possible)
45) It is possible that I exist and no bodies
exist.
46) It is possible that I am not a body.
47) (x)(if x is a body, then necessarily x is a body)
49) If 1 am a body, then necessarily I am a body.
49) I am not a body.
Douglas Long has recently suggested for Descartes a principle
like (47). He offers:
Long*s Principle: (x)(if x is corporeal, then
necessarily x is corporeal
For Long T s Principle to be acceptable to Descartes, *x is corporeal 1
must be understood as *x is a body.* Otherwise, if we allow as
corporeal things that have bodies but are not identical with bodies,
then Descartes would be troubled by the consequence that God, whom
he supposed to have incarnated himself, could not have done otherwise.
Also Descartes would want to hold that he, being in fact in possession
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of a body
,
cor, id as well have been only a disembodied mind. But
even if we understand Long’s Principle as asserting that what is a
body is such that it is necessarily true that it is a body, the
principle as worded is still unacceptable. It leads to a reductlo
.
Supposing our quantifiers to range over only actual entities
,
we can adopt the principle:
P) (x ) (Necessarily
,
if x is corporeal, x exists)
Ihe principle, of course, is false if we consider merely possible
entities. However, there is justification in so restricting our
range of quantification, since the principle, so restricted, is one
to which Descartes gave his tacit assent in the Coglto argument. He
seems there, and elsewhere, to have held that if something has
properties, it exists.^ And our principle is just an instantia-
tion of that principle, which would be false if understood to range
over possible but non-actual entities
.
We can now see the difficulty to which Long’s Principle leads.
It, in conjunction with the principle that what is corporeal exists,
enables us to generate the following undesirable argument:
50) Descartes’ desk is corporeal
.
51) (x)n(if x is corporeal, x exists)
52) <x)(if x is corporeal, then necessarily x is corporeal)
5? ) If *3 (poQ) and 6 p
,
then a Q
.
54) o (Descartes’ desk is corporeal)
55) ES (if Descartes’ diesk is corporeal, Descartes’ desk
exists
.
)
56) a (Descartes f desk exists)
Descartes, of course, held that only God necessarily exists, so we
can suppose that he would reject the argument by rejecting Long’s
Principle
.
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W] ’l'at is needed, then, is a principle that, while it allows
Descartes to get from his conceiving that he is not a body to his
in fact not being one, does not sanction the conclusion that there
are things other than God that exist necessarily. Mvin Plantinga
has proposed such a principle. 12 He suggests that we user
60) (x)(if x is a body, x is essentially a body)
Since *x is essentially F f does not entail ’Necessarily, x is p «
our ej/Tployin.g the notion of an essential property
,
a notion
comfortable to Descartes if not to others, enables us to block
the use of the medal principle (53), and so block the troublesome
conclusion that Descartes* desk exists necessarily. 1^ it is not
clear- whether Plantinga thinks that Descartes held (GO), but it is
clear that he thinks that it, in conjunction with (45), yields the
conclusion that Descartes is not identical with his body. Ob-
viously, though (45) and (60) are net alone sufficient for the
conclusion; the argument is still enthymematic
.
Plantinga fails
to tell us how it is to be filled cut, but I think we can see how
to do it. If we understand essential properties to be those without
which a thing cannot exist, as Descartes seems to do, then if Des-
cartes were essentially a body, it would not be possible for him to
exist in a world devoid of bodies
. But we already have established
that it is possible that Descartes exists and no bodies exist
(given the truth of the thesis that what is conceivable is possible).
Hence, Descartes is not essentially a body, and, by (60), he is not
a body at all.
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us examine the fruit of our labor,
the following argument:
We have constructed
57) I can conceive of myself existing and no
rodies existing.
50) (£}(if d is conceivable,
^ is possible)59) It is possible that I exist and no bodies exist.
60; (x)(if x is a body, x is essentially a body)
61) It I am a body, I am essentially a body.
62) If* I am essentially a body, it is not possible
that I exist and no bodies exist.
63) I am not essentially a body.
64)
1 am not a body.
We now have a valid argument (call it the ’Argument from Conceiv-
ability’) with the conclusion that Descartes desires. We ought,
then, to consider whether Descartes might have offered the argument.
If we can agree that the premises are ones that Descartes would
accept, we ought to ask whether they compel our assent. The argu-
ment has four independent premises, (57), (53), (SO), and (62).
I have suggested that (57) is a plausible interpretation of part
of the quoted passage from Meditation II. The evidence is strong
that Descartes accepted it. To justify introducing (58) I have
appealed to Hume; however, I think that while Descartes never
advanced it explicitly, it is an assumption that underlies many of
his arguments. 14 (60) is never explicitly stated by Descartes,
but there is evidence that he ’would accept it. He seems to hold,
for example
,
that if sometiling has properties that are modes of
thinking or extension, then that thing is essentially thinking or
extended. lj Since bodies have corporeal properties, Descartes
would seem bound to conclude that they have them essentially, and
so are essentially bodies. 16 Finally, (62) is a straightforward
-70 -
ccnsequence of Descartes' notion of an essential property as he
explains it. So I think we are justified in attributing the
premises of our argument to Descartes
. Let us examine them more
closely to see whether Descartes ought to have embraced them.
My strongest reservations have to do with the first premise,
so I should like to suspend discussion of it for the moment. With
respect to the second premise
,
the claim that what is conceivable
is possible, the view is, I have suggested, a well
-rooted tradition
in modern philosophy. To quote Hume:
It is an established maxim in metaphysics
,
that whatever the mind clearly conceives in-
cludes the idea of possible existence, or in
othab words, that nothing we imagine "is abso-
lutcly impossible
.
We can form "the idea of
a golden mountain, and from there conclude
that such a mountain may actually exist. We
can form no idea of a mountain without a valley,
and therefore regard it as impossible. 17
I am willing to give tentative acceptance to the principle on
the basis of its historical patronage, but not without first discuss-
ing the possible existence of counter -examples to the principle and
the problems raised by those examples
.
One of the uses Hume made of (58) was in the attempted refuta-
tion of the view that lav/s of nature are necessary truths
.
He
argues:
We can at least conceive a change in the
course of nature; which sufficiently proves,
that such a change is not absolutely im-
possible
.
To form a clear idea of anything
,
is an undeniable argument for its possibility,
and is alone a refutation of any pretended
demonstration against it. i,Cj
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Kneale, noting the dependence of Hume’s putative refutation on (S3)
argues against the latter. 19 He says;
In any sense of the word ’conceive* which
is relevant the argument, an ability to
conceive the contradictory of a supposed law
of nature does not disprove the suggestion
that the supposed law is a principle of neces-
sxtation. This can be seen from consideration
of a mathematical analogy. In 1742 Goldbach
,
sn otherwise unknown correspondent of the
Sv/Ass mathematician Euler, suggested that
every even number greater than two is the sum
of two primes
. This conjecture has been con-
firmed for ail the even numbers for which it
has been tested, but during the past two cen-
turies no one has succeeded in demonstrating
its truth. The attitude of mathematicians
towards it can, therefore, be expressed by the
statement "Goldbach’ s conjecture looks like a
theorem, but it may conceivably be false* 5
Xneale’s argument seems to be that unproved and unrefuted mathema-
tical propositions are conceivably true (and, we suppose
,
conceivably
false). But, of course, being mathematical propositions they are
necessarily true, if true at all, and hence, not possibly false.
Similarly, if they are false, they are necessarily so, and thus not
possibly false. So we cannot argue from the conceivability of their
truth or falsity to the possibility of their truth or- falsity.
I am inclined to think that Kneale has not made his case strong
enough, though I think it can be so made. As he states it, inis
view seems to allow us to assert the conceivability of any propo-
sition not known to have been shown false , But I think that is to
confuse conceivability with epistemic possibility.*® Surely there
are some constraints on the conceivability of a proposition beyond
not knowing it to have been show, false, h person, on being told
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°nly that a mathematician named 'Goldbach' once issued a conjecture
that haS not bsen sho'm false, would not be sufficiently informed
to conceive its being true. He could perhaps conceive that the
conjecture he had been told about was true, but that is different
from conceiving Goldbach T s conjecture to be true. At least some
more acquaintance with the content of the conjecture seems required
for the latter state of affairs.
However, I think that a sufficiently informed person is in a
position '-O conceive the truth or falsity of the conjecture I
think that I, for example, can conceive of, or imagine, Goldbach's
conjecture being false. Certainly 7. can imagine the discovery by
computer of a counter-example to the conjecture, the attendant
discussion of it, the subsequent revision of philosophical examples,
etc. Similarly, I think that there was a time when I could quite
clearly conceive of trisecting an angle with compass and straight-
edge. During my youth I spent the better part of a school year
trying it before discovering its impossibility
.
Certainly at that
time I could conceive of succeeding at what I was trying to do
.
But, as Kneale has pointed out, it does not follow from rr.y con-
ceiving those states of affairs that* they are possible. We do have
what seems to be at least two counter -examples to the second pramise
of the Argument from Conceivsbility
.
Now it might be objected that I have not really succeeded in
conceiving what I claim to have conceived. 21 For example, with
respect to the case of GoXdbach f s conjecture, it might be eonceeded
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that 1 C5n ifaagine sgnething that results in discussion among
mathematicians, revision of philosophical examples, etc., but still
it can be objected that what I have imagined is not clearly the
discovery of a counter-example to the conjecture. What I have
imagined, it may be argued, differs in no particular respects from
uhst would happen if a. computer discovered something that was
universally, but falsely
,
believed by mathematicians and philosophers
to be a counter-example to the conjecture. While I can imagine a
mathematician reading something on a computer printout as a result
c* which he comes to believe that the conjecture is false, that
would not differ from my imagining a mathematician reading a counter-
examp le on a printout, as a result of which he comes to believe
truly that the conjecture is false. Since the two cases do not
differ in respect to the content of the image, the argument goes,
I have no evidence to support my claim that I have in fact succeeded
in imagining what I claim to have imagined. With regard to my
second example, the trisection of an angle, it can be objected
that I have riot really imagined trisecting an angle, since if I
were able to describe the appropriate steps in the imagined situa-
tion, they could be applied to an actual trisection. I have not
succeeded in imagining the trisection, because my image is not
complete
.
I think that the foregoing objection fails
,
but it serves a
useful purpose in so doing. In particular, it reminds us that we
should be careful not to conflate the notions of conceivability
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end zmaginability. 2 * There is no doubt that in many, perhaps most,
oases of one's conceiving a cartain preposition, there is an
element of imagination involved. But being able to produce imagery
is not necessary to conceiving the truth of a proposition. For
example, we can conceive, but not produce associated images, of
their being forms of life on Mars unlike anything that we can
imagine
. Similarly
,
we can conceive of their being sounds beyond
the humanly audible range
,
but we cannot imagine what such sounds
sound like
. 1 think that the conflation of conceiving and imagin-
ing was begun and fostered by Hume as a result of his psychological
and epistemoJ.ogicai views. But we should not ba limited by Hume's
view. We can conceive propositions
,
the associated states of
affairs of which we cannot imagine c
Descartes
,
too, refused to identify conceivability and imsgin-
ahility. He held that;
I c3.early recognize that I have need of a
particular effort of raind in order to effect
the act of imagination
,
such as I do not
require in order to understand, and this
particular effort of mind clearly manifests
the difference which exists between imagination
and pure intellection.
Descartes* view was that the imagination somehow depended on his
being accidentally joined with a body and that the understanding
nr
could just as wall function without it.
So, it is no objection to my claim to be able to conceive
the falsity of Coldhach's conjecture that the images I associate
with the discovery of a counter-example are compatible with its
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nct bsing the genuine discovery of a counter
-example
. Neither is
it an objection to my claim to be able to conceive of trisecting
m angle with compass and straightedge that I cannot imagine all
of the requisite steps involved. I am inclined to believe, then,
that my putative counter-examples to (58) are genuine.
I want to allow, though, the possibility that an acceptable
analysis of f
t
o is conceivable 7 can be found under which the fore-
going objection fails. Also, I do not deny that I still may be
persuaded that I have not really met the conditions
,
whatever they
are, for actually conceiving what I claim to have conceived. The
importance of the principle we are examining as a philosophical
bedrock cannot be over-estimated. So, we should allow the possi-
bility cf its salvage and proceed now with an examination of the
other premises in the Argument from Conceivability
.
With respect to (62), it should be accepted for the purposes
of our discussion. We may be inclined to reject the notion of
essential properties altogether, but since we have provisionally
accepted the notion, we must allow (62) to stand.
With regard to (60) I am in much the same position I am in
with respect to (58). Plantinga seems to think its truth obvious,
but I know of nothing that can be said about it sufficient to
compel acceptance or rejection. A proponent might argue in its
favor by asking us to try to imagine some material body 7 s losing its
corporeal attributes. I can imagine my desk, for example, without
its actual color, but not without some color or ether. Or possibly
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I can imagine it becoming colorless, but certainly T cannot imagine
its losing the property of extension without ceasing to exist
altogether. The argument has a persuasive ring, and I think it a
decent argument for one claim, albeit not the one it purports to
04
support. I think it is rather en argument to the effect that a
material body cannot lose all its corporeal properties and continue
co exust. But that is consistent with an object 1 s never having had
corporeal properties to begin with. Especially when we turn our
attention to persons
,
the important objects for our purposes
,
the
argument loses some of its appeal. It is difficult for me to
imagine myself losing all of my corporeal properties and continuing
to exist, but I can imagine myself to nave been instantiated in a
world devoid of material objects. It may well ba that, being in
fact a material object, I cannot lose my corporeal properties and
continue to exi.st. But I might have existed without ever having
had corporeal properties to begin with. While I don f t mean to
suggest that my intuitions are persuasive in the matter, they at
least lead me to suspend judgment with respect to (60). It is,
however, an important principle and more needs to be said before
the question of its truth is settled, but for the purposes of
assessing the argument under examination, we can pass on to the
first premise and a more glaring difficulty.
Some would think it odd to challenge the truth of the first
premise. As we have constructed it, (57) seems to report a psycho-
logical fact about Descartes, presumably he knows whether he can
conceive of himself existing and no bodies existing. However, I
ttunk it can be shown that another premise, like the first in form
can be used in the Argument from Conceivability to yield a con-
clusion unacceptable to Descartes and incompatible with the claim
Descartes is not a body. Further, it is a premise the truth
of which Descartes must grant. If that is so, then the use of the
Argument from Conceivability is not available to Descartes.
Recall that at the juncture at which Descartes offers the
Argument from Conceivebility
,
be has established that he exists and
that he thinks, but he does not yet know what he is. That question
remains to be decided. He is able to doubt that he is a body,
bat b.o stil-i. allows that it is possible that he is a body. He says:
I am not that set of limbs called the human
body; I am not some rarefied gas infused into
those limbs
. .
.all these things I am supposing
to be nonentities. But I still have the' asser-
tion *nevertheless I am something. 1 But perhaps
it is the case that these very things which I
suppose to be nonentities
,
and which are not
properly known to me, are in reality not differ-
ent from the nl*? of which I am aware?25
How it may seem that this passage is incompatible with Descartes
remark in Meditation II to the effect that n? I am’ precisely taken
refers only to a conscious being; that is a mind, a soul, an in-
tellect, a reason...” It may be objected that for Descartes it: is
analytic that a mind is a thing that thinks and that what thinks is
a mind. But compatibility between Descartes* claims that he is a
mind and that he does not know whether ha is a body can be obtained
if we allow tliat mind and body may not be distinct substances. There
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is evidence that Descartes was allowing this possibility in the
second Haol t:~,tion
. He says to Hobbes:
...it is very reasonable, and prescribed by
usage
,
to use different names for substances
that we recognize as the subjects of quite
different acts or accidents; we may then
examine later on whether these different
Barnes stand for different tilings
,
or for one
and the same thing. 2®
Descartes here seems willing to grant that, while he knows himself
to be a mind, he may also be identical v/ith his body. This attitude
is expressed again in a passage from Meditation IV (HR-I, 176):
. . .1 not only knew that I exist, inasmuch as
I am a thinking thing, but a certain represen-
tation of corporeal nature is also presented,
to my mind; and it conies to pass that 1 doubt
whether this thinking nature which is in me,
or rather by which I am what I am, differs
from this corporeal nature, or whether both
are not simply the same thing; and I here sup-
pose that I do net yet know any reason to
persuade me to adopt the one belief rather
than the other.
Here
,
however
,
lies the problem for Descartes
.
If he is
entertaining the possibility that he is a mind that is identical
with a body and since he does not know at this point in his inquiry
that there are any disembodied minds
,
then he is bound to grant the
truth of:
65) I can conceive of myself existing and no
minds not identical with a body existing.
(65) is consistent with Descartes* being a mind that is identical
with a body, and it is not ruled out by any proposition known to
Descartes. If Descartes could not conceive of himself being a
corporeal substance with mental attributes, then he would not have
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grown to doubt, as he tells us he did, whether he was non
-corporeal
Surely if one can doubt that j>, than the truth of non-E is at least
conceivable to one. So, Descartes should accept (65).
However, (65) has consequences unacceptable to Descartes, In
conjunction with (58) it yields?
66) Possibly I exist and no minds not identical
with a body exist.
In turn, from (66) and Descartes 1 notion of an essential property
we get:
67) I am not essentially not a body.
So far there 5_s no cd.ffIculty
. But if we are going to attri.bute
(60) to Descartes, then we should also attribute:
63) (x)(if x is not a body, x is essentially not
a body)
There is compelling reason to suppose that Descartes would have
regarded (63) as true.
Given the semantics on which we have tacitly been relying, (60)
says that if something is a body in this world, then in no possible
world relative to this one does it have the property of not being a
body. Now there is no reason to suppose this world special among
possible worlds in regard to the property of being a body. In
general there is no reason to suppose that what is necessarily true
of things in this world is not necessarily true of things in other
worlds possible relative to this one
.
Holding the contrary would
be to advocate a metaphysical principle
,
no defense for which I can
see and certainly none for which Descartes provided.
So, if we think (60) true, we ought to allow that what is a body
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in arty world is a body essentially. 27 But if that is true, then
so is (68). To see why, let us suppose (60) false. If (68) is
false, then there is something, label it T Bruce/ that has the
property of not being a btxiy in this world but does have the
property of being a body in some world possible relative to that
one does it have the property of net being a body. But that
conflicts with our assumption that Bruce has such a property in
this world. By reductio n we see that (68) is true.
Kow we csn see the difficulty to which Descartes is led by
(65). It leads, via (66), to (67), which, conjoined with (68),
entaixs that Descartes is a body. That is a consequence that
Descartes would not accept and one that is the denial of the
conclusion of the Argument from Conceivability
.
Something has gone wrong. Let us recapitulate to see where.
We have given provisional acceptance to all the premises of the
Argument from Conceivability. The first premise seemed least
suspect of all. But if we allow it, then given Descartes* own
remarks
,
we ought to allow as a possible alternative first premise
(65). The argument we get using (65), though, when we add a pre-
mise we seem bound to accept if we accept (60), yields the denial
of the conclusion of the Argument from Conceivability.
We seem to be at an impasse, Given that the argument is unaccept-
able to Descartes, he must reject one of its premises
.
It is open
to Mia, of course, to reject the claim that what is a body is
essentially a body. Indeed, he may never have held it; the evidence
that he did is conjectural. But to reject it is to reject the
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present line of argumentation altogether. X am led to suspect the
second premise, the principle that allows us to infer possibility
from conceinability
,
especially in the present context where we are
playing freely with the notion of essential properties
. it is
clear, however, that Descartes would not reject the principle.
That leaves only the generating premise, the claim that Descartes
can conceive himself to exist bodiless.
from Eoistemic Possibility
Thei'e is a way of re-reading the first premise that holds
some promise of avoiding the. difficulties of the Argument from
Conee ivabilitv and, I think, has the virtue of better representing
Descartes 1 intent in the second Meditation
. It is tempting to
say that Descartes there never intended an argument with the claim
Conceivably X exist and no bodies exist0 as one of its presviises
.
Instead, we might argue, his claim is rather what we would express
by saying that it is epistemieally possible for Descartes that ho
exists and no bodies exist.^ The texc contains evidence that
points in that direction. For example, in reply to the objection
that in the Discourse he assumes without warrant that nothing
corporeal pertains to him, Descartes said that he did not there
claim that he had no corporeal properties
,
but rather Ms claim was
that he did not, so far as he was aware, possess any Jn reply to
critics of Meditation II, Descartes often drew attention to the
passage quoted above to deny that ho was asserting that he was not
corporeal. Rather, he said, ha was not known to be corporeal.
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**" he says in Station II, "...it might possibly be the ease if
I ceased entirely to think, that I should likewise cease altogether
to exist" we can see him as saying that it is possible, for all he
knows
, that if he did not have the property of thinking, he would
not exist. So, instead of (57) as a first premise, Descartes might
have used
•
69/ It is epistemically possible thst I exist
and no bodies exist.
Kow the problem is to get from (69) to "Possibly 1 exist and
no bodies exist” where the possibility in question is logical. It
has been suggested that the epistemically possible is a subset of the
logically possible.'' 1 if that is so
. then it appears that Descartes
can emit the troublesome first and second premises of the Argument
fiom Coneeivability and still have the conclusion he desires
,
Unfortunately, the epistemic possibility interpretation has
two flaws, both ratal. In the first place, it is not true that the
set of propositions that are epistemically possible for someone is
a subset of the propositions that are logically possible. For me,
it is epistemically possible that Goldbach T s Conjecture is false.
We agreed earlier, though, that if it is true, it is necessarily so,
and hence, not possibly false. So, we cannot conclude from some
~
thing f s being epistemically possible for someone that it is also
logically possible
.
The other fatal difficulty for the epistemic possibility
interpretation is that Descartes is here in the same position that
he was in with respect to the Argument from Coneeivability. Given
ths evidence available to him, it should be epistemically possible
for him both that he exists without a body and that he exists and
no mind not identical with a body exists. Descartes simply does
not know what he is
. The proposition that he is bodiless as well
as the proposition that he is identical with a body are both
epistemically possible for him. That being the case, Descartes is
not warranted in asserting (69) to the exclusion of:
70) It is epistemically possible that I exist and
no mind not identical with a body exists.
But ir we allow (70), then all of the difficulties of the Argument
from ConceivabiXity return.
I conclude, then, that the Argument from Epistemic Possibility,
while perhaps closer to Descartes* intent, is akin to the Argument
from Conceivability in being unavailable to Descartes
,
and worse
still in being clearly unsound. The problem, again, is with the
first premise. For Descartes to be able to use it, at the juncture
at which he does, he must also grant the truth of (65) and (70),
statements that generate arguments whose conclusions are the denial
of the claim that Descartes seeks to establish. It would be nice
if Descartes could find some other method of establishing (59), the
claim that it is possible that lie exists and no bodies exist.
Thft Revised Argument from Doubt
70
Such a method has been proposed by George Roberts. He argues
that the interpretation that Malcolm and Kenny (and I) have given to
the Argument from Doubt is mistaken. Roberts offers as a better
interpretation the following:
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71 )
72 )
For me to doubt that I have a body islogically possible.
For me to doubt that I exist is not
-logically possible.
It Is not logically necessary that I am
a body.
It is not clear to me what Roberts thinks the Malcolm-Kenny
interpretation to be, nor how he thinks their premises to differ
from Ms. But it is clear that Roberts’ argument has a different
conclusion. It is not that Descartes is distinct from his body in
fact, but that he is possibly distinct from Ms body. Roberts’
conclusion, then, is the one that we have been trying to establish
without using the first two steps in our Argument from Conceiv-
ability. We ought to look at it closely to see whether the Revised
Argument from Doubt suits our purpose
.
On the face of it, the argument looks invalid. Broadly
construed, it has the form;
a) OP
frjJLa
c) 0 r
And so interpreted, the argument is obviously not valid. But
surely Roberts means something deeper. He probably has in mind
an argument with the form:
d ) 0 Fa
e ) -{TbFT$W
Interpreted in this fashion, Roberts would be saying that there is
a possible world in which Descartes* body has the property of being
doubted by him to exist, but that there is no world in wMch he
has that property. So, there is a world in which Descartes’ body
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h*n « property not had by him, hence a world in which they are
distinct. Given our semantics, that is what is meant by saying
tnat it is possible that Descartes is not identical with his body.
If I have correctly conveyed his intent, then it is surprising
that Roberts did not go on to say that Descartes 1 body has a
property not had by Descartes, that of being possibly doubted by
him to exist, and hence that they are not just possibly distinct,
but are so in fact. That the move from Roberts* argument to the
01 iginal Argument from Doubt is so easy leads one to suspect the
former. I do. The difficulty with the Revised Argument from Doubt
lies in th.r claim that there is no possible world in which Descartes
has the property of being doubted by himself to exist. Descartes
would simply not be warranted in holding that claim. It might be
true that there is no possible world in which Descartes regards:
74) I doubt that I exirst.
as being true of himself: however, as we saw in arguing against
exportation in the case of denials of belief, there might well be
a situation in which?
75) I doubt of myself that I exist.
would be true of Descartes. Presumably, in that situation lie would
net he in a position to affirm (75), but it might be true nonethe-
less
. It would ba true
,
for example
,
if Descartes were in fact
identical with his body, albeit unknown to him, and:
7?) I doubt of my body that it exists,
were true of him
.
Roberts is not warranted in asserting one of the premises of
hm argument, so the Revised Argument from Doubt: cannot be used by
us to repair the Argument from Conceivability
.
We must look
elsewhere
,
The Argument from Incorrigibility
George Nakhnikian apparently thinks that the notion of incor-
rigibility can, be used to establish the claim that possibly
Descartes exists bodiless. 7 ^ He says:
Jit a time when I am still withholding assent
from the proposition that I am or have a body
the proposition that I am thinking is incor-
rigible for me. Even if it turned out that
I had no body
,
it would still be incorrigible
for me that X am thinking. Hence, the follow-
ing tliree things are possible at the same
time: I exist, 1 am not a body, X do not have
a body. In other words, it is possible that
I am nothing but a mind existing without a
body. I find this conclusion to be wholly
justified .3*+
At first glance
,
Nakhnikian seems to have confused logical pos-
sibility with epistemic possibility. He seems to be saying, for
Descartes
,
that as far as he knows lie is not a body, but that he
knows hiruse If to exist and to be thinking; therefore, it is pos-
sible that he exists and is not a body. But for that argument to
be good, the possibility in question would have to be epistemic.
Clearly, Nakhnikian intends logical possibility, so, one might
suppose, his confusing the two has led him to a bad argument.
But I think that that confusion is not Nakhnikian* s . He seems to
be saying something different, and his confusion goes deeper
.
After interpreting Descartes* argument from Meditation VI in such a
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way that it argues for the conclusion:
78) I can exist without my body.
Nakhnikian says:
I think that (78) has already been proved
by the fact that "I think" is incorrigible
for la,,1
,
Si d tout that fact would not change
even if it turned out that there ware no
material objects. Hence, it is possible
that I am nothing but a mind existing
without a body.
'
It is not clear to me how the fact that "I think" is incorrigible
is supposed to be relevant to Nakhnikian’s defense of (78),
Earlier he has defined the notion of incorrigibility as follows:
79) £ is incorrigible for S =df (i) It is
possible that S believes that p } and (ii)
f S believes attentively that p'r "entails
’S knows that £.*56
The notion of attentive belief is designed to capture Descartes’
notion of clear and distinct perception. For our purposes we can
ignore the notion and read the definition as referring to belief
sirapliciter
. I think, however, that one feature of the definition
is important for interpreting Nakhnikian’s remarks about (78).
Notice that if someone believes an incorrigible proposition, then
he knows chat proposition, and hence, it is true.
I suggest that we can find here a clue to Nakhnikian’s con-
fusion. He regards 5 1 think’ and M exist’ as incorrigible, but
not f X have a boay
.
T So, he is led to say, evert if I had no body,
my believing that I exist and that I think would guarantee the truth
of those statements. Thus, he would say, it is possible that I
exist and think, but have no body. It is not difficult to see that
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trha reasoning is specious. It is true that if I had no body,
'I exist* and. *1 think* would still be incorrigible for me. But
that is an epistemic fact about those statements, one that is quite
independent of the question whether I am identical with my body.
It might even be that I am necessarily identical with my body,
and hence, cannot exist without it, but still that *1 think* is
incorrigible for me and * I have a body* is not. If so, *1 exist*
and *1 think,* despite being incorrigible for me, would not be
true ix I had no body
. In particular
,
their truth would not be
guaranteed by the second condition of Nskhnikisn*s analysis, since
the left hand side of that condition would not be true. That is,
having no body, I would not exist, and so could entertain no
beliefs. I believe that Makhnikian is guilty of the confusion I
have outlined, so I think that he has given us no successful argu-
ment for the conclusion we seek, i.e., that Descartes is possibly
distinct from his body.
Nakhnikian*s argument, however, suggests another that might
hold promise. Indeed, it may even be the argument that Nakhnikian
had in mind. Incorrigible statements are sometimes said to be those
whose truth follows from their being believed. In like manner,
epistemologically indubitable statements are sometimes said to be
those whose truth follows from their being doubted
,
For example
,
boths
80) I believe chat I exist,
and
81) 1 doubt that I exist.
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entail:
82) I exist.
Likevd.se, both:
83) I believe that I think,
and
84) I doubt that I think.
entail:
85) I think.
Thus ’I exist 1 and *1 think * are both incorrigible and epistemolo-
gically indubitable. They are so, because my believing and my
doubting anything at all entail that I exist and that I think.
b. *2* ,ay believing or doubting that I exist or think entails
that I exist and that I think.
We saw that 1 1 have a body* (and, *1 am a body*) is not incor-
rigible under Nakhnikian's definition. Similarly, it may be
argued
,
it is neither incorrigible nor indubitable under the above
definitions
. That is
,
it does not follow from my believing that
I have a body or my doubting that I have a body that I do in fact
have a body. Or, what amounts to the same thing, neither:
86) I believe that I have a body.
nor
87) I doubt that I have a body.
entails:
88) I have a body.
However, (86) and (87) do entail (82). We agreed that it follows
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frow ray believing or doubting anything that I exist. Further,
since (8..<) and (87) entail (82) but not (83), neither does (82)
entca t (88), for if it did, than so would (36) and (87). That is,
at Goes not follow from the fact that I exist that I have a body.
Or, put differently, it is possible that I exist and do not have
a body.
Wc SQ-cia
,
then, to have the argument for which we have been
searching. In fact, at least one philosopher thinks that the
argument is Descartes ». Robert Jaeger has argued that when
Descartes says that he can doubt that his body exists but not
that he exists, he intends the following argument;
89) S I doubt that I exist 1 dty »i exist*
90) *1 doubt that I exist* dp *Kv body exists*
91) *1 exis t* *My body exists*
92) PossiEly I exist and my body doesn't.
Jaeger does riot think the argument successful, and neither do I.
The problem with it, in my opinion, is that any defense of (90)
either begs the question or relies on the previously maligned
principle that allows us to derive possibility from conceivability
,
the principle that the argument is designed to circumvent. It is
true that *My body exists* is not incorrigible under Nakhnikian*s
definition, but whether it is so under the revised definition,
i.e., whether *1 believe that my body exists* entails *my body
exists,* is unsettled. Any argument to the effect that the entail-
menu relationship does not ho3d amounts to claiming that I can
exist and entertain doubt without being embodied. But, to assert
that is just to assert the conclusion of the argument, and in so
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doing
,
to beg the Question.
A_Re i;.i,sed Argument from Coneexvab111 tv
Thfire 1S cne lasr Possibility for avoiding the objection I
have raised against the Argument from Conceivability
. Roderick
Chisholm has suggested that Descartes can construct a respectable
vei^ion of the argument and avoid my objection by providing an
emended account of essential properties,"^®
Recall that I have attributed to Descartes the following
principle regarding essential properties:
93) (x)(F)(if x has F essentially, then x
cannot exist without having F)
It is Chisholm y s suggestion that Descartes should replace (93)
with:
94) (x)(F)(x has F essentially if, and only
if
,
x cannot be conceived except as havina
F) y
It is easy to see how Chisholms suggested principle blocks
my objection to the Argument from Conceivability. I have pointed
out that some of Descartes ’ remarks commit him to:
65) I can conceive of myself existing and no
minds not identical with a body existing.
And 1 remind Descartes that (65) along with:
58) (n)(if £ is conceivable, j) is possible)
yields:
66) Possibly I exist and no minds not identical
with a body exist.
Then from (66) and (93), a principle given by Descartes’ notion of
an essential property, wc get:
6?) I am not essentially not a body.
I then point out the disastrous consequences that ensue from the
assumption that in some possible world Descartes is a body. Eut
with Chisholm’s help Descartes could now reply: "My account of
essential properties is given in (94) above. Although I accept
(58), your derivation of (87) from (66) is invalid, since it re-
quires (95), which I do not accept."'^
At first glance it may seem that Chishclm T s strategy is not
successful unless Descartes also denies Hume ’ s thesis (i.e.,
(58)), since (94), in conjunction with Hume’s thesis is equivalent
to (93). The objection, however, is shortsighted. Although Hume
doubtless held that the conceivability of a proposition is both
necessary arid sufficient: for its possibility, 1 have not attributed
the biconditional to Descartes, He held that some states of affair
that are actual, e.g., God’s infinite perfection and the theologi-
cal "mysteries are in fact beyond human comprehension, and so,
presumably, they would not be conceivable. I don’t think, then,
that Descartes accepted:
95) (|>)(if id is possible, g. is conceivable)
But (95), in addition to (58), is needed to get (94) from (93).
One further putative objection to Chisholm’s principle seems
possible. An essentialist would probably hold that the property
being such that when added to 84 it yields 121 is essential to the
number 37. Eut, it might be objected, the student who does
poorly in arithmetic may conceive that 37 does not have that
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propsr'cy
. Thus, by Chisholm's principle and contrary to the
pronouncement of the essentialist, it dees not have that property
essentially. I think Chisholm could parry the objection and thereby
save his principle by pointing out that it is worded so as to require
de re conceivability and by claiming that the student's limited
intellectual resources have confined him to de dieto conceivability
with respect to numbers
. if he had an adequate level of acquaint-
ance with the objects of his inquiry to achieve de re conceivability
with respect to 37, than the student would not be able to conceive
that 37 leeks the property in question.
Having successfully blocked my objection to the Argument
from Conceivability by providing an alternative treatment of
essential properties
,
Chisholm suggests that we replace the argu-
ment with one formulated this way:
S’6) My body cannot be conceived to be incorporeal.
97) I can be conceived to be incorporeal.
98 > I my “body
It should be obvious, though, chat this argument is open to the
same objections that led to the fall of the Argument from Doubt.
If asked to defend (95) Descartes would have to appeal to its de
die
t
o counterpart:
99) I cannot conceive that my body is incorporeal.
But we have seen that while statements like (97) can be got from
statements like:
100) I can conceive that I am incorporeal,
by exportation, it is not the case that exportation is allowable
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Wlth re ‘spect t0 clenlals of belief statements like (99). We want
to allow that Descartes T body can in fact be conceived to be
incorporeal, and would be so if, unbeknownst to Descartes, he was
identical with his body and if he conceived himself to be incorpo-
real. Since Chisholm 1 s suggested argument relies upon unwarranted
exportation in defense of one of its premises, it must be rejected.
However, there is another argument, one not requiring exporta-
tion, that Cldsholm might try in place of the rejected argument.
Appealing to (94) and the principle that what is a body is essen-
tially a body, Chisholm has suggested the principle:
101) No purely corporeal thing can be conceived
as being incorporeal.
Usiih that principle we can get the following Revised Argument from
Cortce ivability
:
102) (x)(if x can be conceived as being incorporeal,
x is not a purely corporeal thing)
103) (x)(if x is a body, x is a purely corporeal thing)
104) I can be conceived as being incorporeal.
105) I am not a purely corporeal thing*.
106) I am net a body.
The first premise of the argument is the contrapositive of (101)
when the latter is put into quantificational form. If Descartes
accepted Chisholm's suggested principle, (101), then he would no
doubt accept the argument, since its only other independent premise,
(104), is cei'tairily one which Descartes embraced, especially in the
passages that deal with the nature of minds
,
bodies
,
and himself
.
Further, this argument is not open to the objection directed
against Cfiisholm's first argument, so it looks as though it might
bo a better one. But I think it is not.
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a.t will turn cut that the Revised Argument from Conceivabiltty
is at best open to the same type of objection that destroyed the
original Argument from Coneeivability
. But it may even be that
the present argument fails to get off the ground in virtue of the
fact that the principle on which it is founded, Chisholm 1 s analysis
of essential pioperties, is false. It seems to allow a counter-
example. Surely Chisholm, and Descartes if he goes along with the
argument, will grant that, with respect to people whom we see on
the street, we can conceive them to be incorporeal. But if that
is so, it seems that I could mistake a cleverly designed and con-
structed robot for a person. We can suppose it to possess whatever
degree of perfection that is required to mislead me into thinking
it to be a fellow traveler. There seems no doubt that I could have
de re beliefs with respect to it while thinking it to be a person.
In addition, it is such that, thinking it to be a person, I could
conceive of it being incorporeal. It is, of course, a purely cor-
poreal thing, and we have what seems to be a counter-example to
Chisholm* s principle.
We can suppose, though, that Chisholm would have a rejoinder
to the claimed counter-example, so we should show that the revised
argument is open to a much more telJ.ing objection. As we saw in
discussing the Argument from Conce.inability
,
in the passages we
have considered where Descartes examines the nature of himself,
and prior to attempting to demonstrate the distinctness of himself
and his body, he allows that he may ba identical with his body. He
knovfs himself to be s mind
,
but he allows chat he may be a mind
that is identical with a body
. Given that allowance
,
Descartes
should grant the truth of:
107)
I can be conceived to be corporeal.
Further, if he accepts Chisholm’s principle, (101), then the same
considerations that led to the establishment of it will lead also
to;
108) No purely incorporeal thing can be conceived to
be corporeal.
which Descartes would be obliged to accept. But (107), conjoined
with (103), entails:
109) I am not a purely incorporeal thing.
Now those commentators who regard Descartes as having thought
himself to be identical with his mind and as only concomitantly
being in possession of a body will find (109) a disquieting
result, certainly sufficient to justify abandonment of the Revised.
Argument from Conceiv&bility
.
However, those who regard Descartes
as having thought himself to be identical with a mind -body union
will not be disturbed by (109). It takes another result to
disturb them
.
Given Descartes* allowance that he may be a mind that is
identical with a body, he should grant the truth not only of (107)
but also:
110) I can be conceived to have the property of
being identical with my body.
The mind-body unionists will regard the conceived state of affairs
in (110) as having been ultimately shown to be false, but they will
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«t least grant its conceivability
. However, from (110) and (94)
we can infer:
Ul) The property of not being identical with
my body is net essential to me.
I think that (111) is a conclusion that Descartes would deny
outright
. But if not, he would at least accept:
68) (x)(if x is not identical with a body, x
is essentially not identical with a body)
He would be bound to accept (68) in the present circumstance since
lie has given tacit approval to:
60) (x)(if x is a body, x is essentially a body)
from which, in conjunction with (94), (101) was derived, and we
have seen earlier that a commitment to (50) obliges one to accept
(69). Further, (68), conjoined with (111) entails that Descartes
is identical with a body. That, both the unionists and their
adversaries will agree, is & result that Descartes would not
accept. I conclude, then, that m must reject the Revised Argument
from Coneeivability as being no better off than its predecessor and
of no use to Descartes
.
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12. "Vvorld and Essence,” Phil. Rev., Oct., 1970, p. 405.
13. Intake it to be a desideratum of an analysis of *x has F
eosentially* that it does not entail * necessarily™ x has" F.
seems presupposed, for example, in Principle
LIII (Haldane and Ross, Vol. 1
,
p. 240).
‘
15. Compare Principle LIXI. Descartes is often accused of holding
that his essence is tMnking solely on the basis of Ms
possessing mental attributes
.
16. The view I have attributed to Descartes is a strong one, and
in fact, in conjunction with two other views often attributed
to him, it would give the conclusion that he is not a body.
The other views are (a) that substances have only one essen-
tial property and (b) that any two things with different
essential properties are distinct substances
.
Since he knows
that he has the property of thinking, Descartes could conclude
from the principle I have attributed to him that he is not
identical with his body
. This argument is not one that
Descartes ever offered, and it is net one that we should offer
for him. In the first place, the principle X attributed to
him needs more argued support, but more importantly, (b) above
is a claim that Descartes seems to repudiate (Haldane and Ross,
Vol. II, pp . 52-53). In addition, the argument would be incon-
sistent with Descartes* claim in reply to the second and third
sets of objections that he does not conclude from Ms having
the property of thanking that he is not identical with his body.
17
. Treatise , Bk. I, Pt . II, sect. 2.
18. Treatise
,
3k „ I, Ft, III, sect. 6.
19. Probabili ty and Induction
, pp. 79-00.
20. Epistemic possibility, so called
,
was first discussed by
Moore ("Certainty” in Philosophical Papers) and more recently
it has been discussed by Wilfrid Sellars ("Phenomenalism" in
Science
,
Perception , and Reality) and Paul Teller ("Epistemic
Possibility Fnilosophia
,
Oct., 1972). Without so calling it,
Kintikka discusses" epistemic possibility at length in Knowledge
and Belie f
.
21
. It has been so objected in private correspondence by Jay
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NOTES
CHAPTER II
1
.
2
.
3.
4.
5.
6
.
7.
8
.
9 ,
10
.
11
.
&C, 32. At least two arguments
I have quoted only what pertains
are suggested in this passage,
to the one I am examining
.
f PHR-Tgt440alSO SU3gests th® ar9UffianC in Notes Against
HR-II
,
80.
Doney, pp. 328-329.
Malcolm’s third argument is like his second.
I count myself among them. All putative counter-examples
that I have seen rest on scope ambiguities in the use of
usfinite descriptions
. The issue is discussed by Robert
Swartz in "Leibniz’s Law and Belief" j.p Vol ' No
pp. 122-137. " “
* * ’
Exportation with respect to belief statements is discussed
by Ernest Sosa in "Propositional Attitudes De Dicto and De
Rg / J.P. , Vol. 67, No. 21, pp. 883-896.
I don’t mean here to imply that all of our de re beliefs are
arrived at by exportation from de dicto beliefs .’ I simply
mean to claim that the inference is warranted in this case
Replace in (24) and (25) with ’Hooker, 1 and (24) becomes
a proposition that: you would tie warranted in inferring from
(25), if you knew the latter and the additional facts about
me given above
.
I speak loosely here of our being warranted in inferring one
proposition from another in seme cases and not in others
.
Strictly speaking, I suppose, 1 should rather say that we are
warranted in exporting from some proposition, p, to a proposi-
tion, q, when, and only when, we know the truth of some ether
proposition, r, such that it, in conjunction with entails q
It is the proposition, r, that embodies the collateral infor-
mation necessary to justify exportation.
Treatise
,
Bk. I, Pt. II, sect. 2 (Selby -Bigge
,
p. 32).
"Descartes f Argument for Mind -Body Dualism,” Philosophical
Forum, Spring ’69, p. 265.
Compare Principle X (HR-I, .222), Principle XI (HR-I, 223),
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22
.
rmAosopnv or Tncugftt and Action.
25. Meditation II (Anscombe and Geach, p. 69).
26. Anscorabe and Geach, p. 131.
27. Planting i holds the stronger principle and apparently thinks
its truth obvious ( "World and Essence/’ p. 48
*
5 ). I do not
think it' truth obvious
,
but I do believe that a c ornmitmen
t
to (60) obligates one to hold the stronger principle.
28. See Note No. 20.
29. HR
-I, 137.
30. HR-II, 133
,
211, and 30.
31. By Lennart Aqvist in a paper on subjunctive conditionals read
at tha University of Massachusetts in the spring of 1970.
32. ’’Some Questions in Epistemology," Proceedings of the Arista-
telian Society
. 1969-70, pp . 37-60.
‘ “ " ~ '
33. An Introduc tion to Philosophy
, pp. 146-147.
34. p. 146.
35. p. 147.
36. pp. 70-75.
37. Jaeger offers this interpretation in "Doubt, My Body, and I"
and "The World, Perception, and the Self," both yet to be
published
. J have benefitted from correspondence with him on
this and related issues
.
.38
.
Chisholm’s argument was conveyed in private correspondence
.
I am grateful to him for helping me come to grips with the
natters discussed in this dissertation.
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39 . Though Descartes never
evidence that he would
fisct that his follower
essence as "everything
nor be conceived
.
n
advanced Chisholm* s principle, some
regard it favorably is given by the
Regis in his Cours Enticr defined
without which a tiling can neither be
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CHAPTER III
Up to this point we hove been considering arguments for
the distinctness of Descartes and his booy that can be supported
by textual material contained in Meditation II and Discourse iv.
But to bo fair to him, it should be noted that Descartes denied
having proved distinctness until the sixth Meditation, in reply
to Hobbes* objection that the thing that thinks may be corporeal,
Descartes tells )iis reader;
h £2lli:£ that thinks , ha says
,
may ha
cor >oreal; and the opposite
Si bnat has been assumed ; not proved”
But really I did not assume the'Toposite
,
neither did I use it as a basis for my
argument; I loft it wholly undetermined
until Meditation VI, in which its proof
is given I
‘
k little later, in speaking of mind and body, he says;
But after v?e have formed two distinct
concepts of those two substances, it is
easy, from what has been said in the
sixth Meditation, to determine whether
they «re one and the same or distinct. 2
When we turn to the sixth Meditation
,
where distinctness is
supposedly proved
,
we find a lengthy passage treating of the mind
and the body, but not a very clear argument. Descartes says;
And first of all, because I know that
all tilings which I apprehend clearly
and distinctly can be created by God
as I apprehend them, it suffices chat
I am able to apnrehend one thing apart
from another clearly and distinctly in
order to be certain that the one is
different fxm the other, since they my
be made to exist in separation at least
by tha omnipotence of God; and it does
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not signify by what power this separation
is made in order to compel me to judge them
to be different; and, therefore, just because
I know certainly that 1 exist, and that mean-
while I do not remark that any other thing
necessarily pertains to my nature or essence
excepting that I am « thinking thing, I rightly
conclude that my essence consists solely in
the fact that I am a thinking thing
. And al-
though possibly (or rather certainly, as I
shall say in 3 moment) 1 possess a body with
which I am very intimately conjoined, yet
because
,
on the one side, 1 have a clear and
distinct .idea of myself inasmuch as I am only
a thinking and unextended thing
,
and as
,
on
the other, I possess a distinct idea of body,
inasmuch as it is only an extended and un~
thinking thing, it is certain that this I is
entirely and absolutely distinct from my body,
ana can exist without it. J
This passage can be variously interpreted to get out a number of
different arguments
.
When we try to tease cut the most premising argument, we come
up with two candidates. The first is fairly brief and comes not so
much from what Descartes says in the passage as from what he claims
elsewhere to have said in the passage , Stripped of its trappings
,
the argument goes as follows:
3*) I clearly and distinctly conceive that I
am separate from my body
.
2) Whatever 1 clearly and distinctly conceive
is true
.
J) 1 am separate from my body.
Since the worth of this argument clearly turns on Descartes* defense
of (2), end since discussing his defense of (2) requires coming to
grips with the Cartesian Circle, I should like to suspend discussion
of it for the moment. Let us look first at the other argument.
Before doing so, however, I should point out at this juncture
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a problem for interpreting Descartes* arguments. It is often not
clear in a particular passage whether Descartes is arguing for the
distinctness of himself and his body or for the distinctness of mind
and body. He often, as in the above passage, seems to switch
back and forth between the two. Many philosophers
? 0f course, will
regard Descartes as having thought himself to be a mind, so it is
not important to them whether Descartes refers to himself or to
mind in proving distinctness. While I don’t want to commit myself
regarding the question of what Descartes thought himself to be, I
do think that much the same considerations apply to proofs of the
distinctness of Descartes and his body as apply to proofs of the
distinctness of mind and body. I shall often take the liberty of
viewing Descartes as attempting to prove the non
-identity'- of him-
self and his body when he more properly appears to be concerned to
prove the non -identity of mind and body. I am not aware of any
problems created as a result cf my taking that liberty, though X
shall often caution the reader as to my intent.
The Argument from Distinct Conception
It is not easy to see exactly what argument Descartes intends
when he speaks of apprehending (conceiving, we will say) one thing
apart from another, h fairly simple argument first suggests
itself:
A. 4) I can conceive of myself without conceiving
of my body
.
S’) "l am "'distinct from my body.
This argument seems ambiguous between:
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B. 6) I can conceive that I exist and have
no body
.
TT X Irakis tinct from my body.
and
C. 8) I can be conceived by me without my body
being conceived by me
.
95 3Tam distinct from my body.
Argument (P>), to the extent that it can be made deductively
respectable, is simply a restatement of the Argument from Con-
ceivaoility
.
We would conclude from (6) that Descartes is possibly
distinct from h;rs body, and then employ a premise to the effect
that If something is identical with a body, then it is necessarily
identical with a booy. But the faults of that argument are well
known
.
Argument (C), on the other hand, has not before been intro-
duced, but its vaults have
. Filled out, it would look something
like the following:
. 10) I have the property of being possibly conceived
by me without my body at the same time being
conceived by me
.
11) My body does not have the property of being
possibly conceived by me without my body at
the same time being conceived by me.
32L. ( FxsFy
)
13) I r ray body
The trouble with (C*
)
should be clear from our discussion of the
Argument from Doubt. To get (10) Descartes would presumably have
to Infer it from something like:
14) I can conceive of myself at t-1 without
conceiving of my body at t-1.
From (14) he exports to:
15) I have the property of being conceived by
ma at t-1.
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artd
16) My body doss not have the property ofbeing conceived by me at t-1.
Then from (15) snd (IP) Descartes constructs (10). Premise ( 11 )
we can suppose to be s truth of reason.
Ths argument would seem to be successful if the moves from
(14) to (15) and from (14) to (16) are acceptable. But while we
may want to allow exportation from (14) to (15), it should be clear
from our earlier discussion that we do not want to allow it from
(14) to (16), We want to allow for the possibility that Descartes,
in conceiving himself, also, albeit unknown to him, conceives his
body. If he does conceive of his body in that situation, then,
of course, he conceives of it under a description that does not
permit him to recognize that iris body is in fact being conceived
by him , For example, if Descartes is in fact, though unbeknownst
to him, identical with his body, then in conceiving of himself he
is also conceiving of his body.
In the same way, if I am ignorant of the fact that Richard
Nixon is President of the United States, but I know something about
his political past, then I might conceive of Richard Nixon as
being an unscrupulous person. But I may further hold that 1 could
not conceive of the president of the United States as being any-
thing but a person of highest scruples. We may want to claim in
such a case that Richard Nixon has the property of being conceived
by me to be unscrupulous
.
but we would not be warranted in inferring
also that the President of the United States does not have that
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property
. In fact he would have the property
that Nixon is President.
in question, giver.
The problem, of course, is with exportation in the case of
denials of the holding of some propositional attitude. It is a
matter of fact about human cognition that we claim to have de re
beliefs and that we claim to be sometimes warranted in inferring
then from de dicto propositions. But if that is so, then it is
unsafe ever to infer the denial of a de re attitude from the denial
of the corresponding de dicto attitude.4 Since that is a move that
is required for Descartes to get the first premise in (CM, J
conclude that (C l ) is not an acceptable argument.
If a respectable argument can be constructed from the passage
in ^fetation VI, it is not one that is as simple as (B) and (C),
It must, ns the text suggests, at least have something to do with
what is within God 1 s power. George Nakhnikian has reconstructed
what he believes to ha the argument that Descartes intended in the
passage we are examining. 1'' He offers:
D. 17) If I know that all things that I conceive
clearly and distinctly can be produced by
God exactly as I conceive them, and I can
clearly and distinctly conceive x apart
from y and y apart from x, then I am certain
that x and y are distinct (different) from
each other and can exist apart from each
other*
.
18) I know that all things I conceive clearly
and distinctly can be produced by God
exactly as I conceive them,
iwr If 1 clearly and distinctly conceive x
apart from y and y apart from x , then I
am certain that x and y are different
from each other, and can exist apart from
each other.
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20) I find that thinking and thinking only is
^of_tha_ossenoe of the I of "i think, 1 exist.”
lx) I am only a thinking thing, or a substance
whose entire essence is to think.
22) I have a distinct idea of body, whose
is t0 *>e extended and unthinking.
23) I have a clear and distinct idea that I
my body are apart from each other
.
24) I am distinct from my body.
Nakhnikian* s argument certainly has the complexity one would
expect of a reconstruction cf Descartes* argument. But if Descartes
actually intended the argument Nakhnikian offers, he shouldn 1 u have.
The argument has a number of faults
,
not the least of which is
its disjointedness
.
As it stands, premises (21) and (22), which
Nakhnikian apparently sees as supporting (23), although they do not
entail it, are alone sufficient for the conclusion. Restating them
somev’hat, we get the argument:
5. 25) My essence is tc think.
26) It is not the case that the essence
of my body is to think.
27 y I '/my”body
where the inference from (25) and (26) to (27) is justified by
what we have called 'Leibniz* Law. 1 A somewhat different argument
suggested by (21) and (22) is:
F. 28) My essence is to think.
29) The essence of bodies is extension.
30) If two substances (things) have different
essences, they are distinct.
3ITT ? my body
So it is not clear why Descartes would have offered all of argument
(D) when only a part would have been sufficient.
or
He should not be faulted too severely, though, if either (E)
(F) can be successfully defended. Unfortunately, neither can.
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Both depend upon Descartes* claim that his essence is to think,
and in the argument at hand, that claim is net adequately defended.
As ivakhnikian has it, and as the passage seems to, Descartes* sole
defense of the claim that his essence is to think lies in (20),
the assertion that he doss not know of any other properties that
pertain to his essence.
It seems that Descartes has failed to establish not only that
thinking is his only essential property, and hence his entire
essence, but also he seems not to have shown even that thinking
is essential to ham. It should be granted perhaps that Descartes
kno^t himself to think, but it does not follow from his possessing
the property of thinking, that he lias that property essentially.
It may be that Descartes is tacitly appealing, or could appeal, to
the principle:
32) (x)(if x thinks, then x is essentially
u thinking thing)
to establish that thinking is essential to him. But while we may
be inclined to grant (32), we should balk at an unquestioned
acceptance of:
33) (x)(if x thinks, then thinking is the
only essential property had bv x)
That is a claim that surely requires substantial support, and the
present argument gives it none, Admittedly, Cartesian essentialism
recognizes only two properties as being essential to created sub-
stances, viz,, thinking and extension, but it is still an open
question how those properties distribute among created substances.
In particular, (33) would require much support. 6
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Vte will examire the extent to which Descartes was elsewhere
successful in establishing (32) and (33) somewhat later, but for
the moment we can leave that investigation and return to Nakhnikian's
argument. It does not need (20), (21), and (22) since they were
offered only in support of (23). Even if we give Descartes that
premise
,
the argument is still clearly not successful.
In the first place, the argument, as it is stated, is invalid.
If it establishes anything, it establishes:
25 ) I cun certain that I and my body are distinct.
not (24). And (25) seems to refer to psychological certainty, not
to tbs epistemological certainty of s particular proposition. At
least the argument, as it stands, is inadequate to establish (25)
where the certainty there expressed is epistemic. It does not
follow from my being certain that £ that the proposition £ is
itself certain, or even that £ is true. Nakhnikian has faithfully
rendered the text when he refers in (17), and again in (19), to
the possibility of his certainty. But ha must not eliminate
reference to his certainty in the conclusion; it should be (25)
not (24).
Of course, (25) is not the conclusion Descartes is locking
for. Descartes* actual conclusion is even less well established
than (24), He concludes:
26) It is certain that I am distinct from
my body.
It would be better to drop all references to certainty, whether
psychological or epistemological, in (D). The argument is surely
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n° W0PSe off without it, and is probably easier to defend.
One other dxuiculty besets the formal structure of the argu-
ment, (24) should come from (19) and (23) by application of modus
But (23) is clearly not the antecedent of (19). The
difference between them is important. It is the difference between
IS. til r/,) de cioto constructions, and we are aware by now that much
turns on which of those two constructions we employ. The text
seems to favor ade re reading of its premises, but it is not
altogether clear that it does. We should restate the argument by
providing two versions of (D), adhering throughout the one to de r
e
locutions and throughout the other to de dieto locutions.
Our restatement can be simplified by reducing the number of
premises in the argument. For example, v/e can reserve reference
to God’s power for a defense of the truth of our first premise.
Similarly, we can reserve (20), (21), and (22) for our defense of
(23). Bared of their non-essentials, then, we get the following
candidates for Descartes* argument:
G. 34) If I can conceive x without conceiving
y, then x is distinct from y.
35) Jr I can conceive myself without conceiving
my body, then 1 am distinct from my body.
36) I can conceive myself without conceiving
my body
.
TFT I am distinct from my body.
K. 38) If I can conceive that x and y are
distinct from each other, then x is
distinct from y.
39) If I can conceive that I am distinct
from my body, then I am distinct from
my body.
40 ) I c an conceive that I am distinct from my body.
41) "~I f- my "Fody '
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How should we assess <G> and (H)f Let us begin with (G). There
is some evidence that Descartes intended an argument like (G). In
defending his argument for the distinctness of the mind and the
body against Regius’ manifesto, Descartes writes:
•
;
*wb.ence I deduced and demonstrated that
mind was clearly perceived by us as an
existence
,
or substance, even supposing wehad no concept whatever of the body, and
denied that any material things had ’exis-
tence; and accordingly, that the concept
oi mind did not involve any concept of
body
. .
.
Our friend, however, admits that
mind can sometimes be cognized apart from
body, to wit, when there are doubts about
the body; whence it assuredly follows that
mind cannot be termed a mode of body. 6
The argument Descartes here suggests admittedly can be read
^ but it also accommodates an interpretation according to
which Descartes is claiming that the mind can be conceived without
the tody at the same time being conceived,
A troublesome fact about (G) is that v;e have in it an argument
no premise of which needs to be, or can be defended by an appeal to
God *s power. What is worse, while (34) and (35) seem unobjection-
able, it is not clear how Descartes can defend (36). The problem
confronting him here is the same as that which confronted him in
defending the first premise of (C f )„ Given that Descartes does not
know yet whether he is distinct from his body, he is not warranted
in claiming that in conceiving himself he does not also, unknown
to him, conceive his body.
It seems perhaps that part of the purpose of the appeal to
essence is in defense of (35). Descartes seems to be sayi.ng that
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te0auSe M* *»**«*• is different from the essence of body, then ha
csn conceive of hi see If without conceiving of his body. But, as we
have seen, Descartes hasn't adequately established the claim about
hlS es£en~e
>
and if he had established it, he wouldn't need an
argument like (G) to prove distinctness. We should dismiss (G)
and hope for something better in (H )
„
I take Descartes to have appealed to God's power in an attempt
to establish the truth of (38). He seems at first to have been
relying upon the principles:
42) (p)(if I can conceive that p, then Grxi
makes it possible that p)
and
4i) (p)(if God makes it possible that p,
then p is true)
Ihat is, he claims that from his conceiving that his mind and body
are distinct, we can conclude that God can make them distinct. And
if God can make them distinct, then they are distinct. However,
Descartes surely only appears to hold (42) and (43); we must suppose
that he didn't in fact think them true. Together they lead to a
host of contradictions. I have argued earlier that Descartes can
also conceive that his mind and body are non-distinct,. So from
(42) and (43), he should be able to conclude:
44) I am identical with my body,
but that is the denial of the claim they are meant to establish.
What is worse, given (42) and (43) we must conclude that
whatever is possible for God is actual. But since every contingent
state of affairs is such that it is within God f s power to bring
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that state of affairs about, then by <«) every possible state of
affairs is actual. So then, every contingent state of affairs, p,
and its contrary,
-p, will both be actual. But that is a contra-
diction. Since Descar tes held that ever. God could not bring about
a contradiction, we must refuse to hold (0?) and (41) together, fit
least one must be rejected.
Kow it may seem that I have misrepresented Descartes
. One
might be inclined to object that Descartes was concerned not about
the conceiva.bility of propositions slmpllciter but, rather, about
the possibility of conceiving that one thing is distinct from
another. In particular, to represent Descartes 1 concern, It might
be cl aimed, we ought to replace (42) with:
44) (x)(y)(if I can conceive that x and v are
distinct, then Gcd can make it possible
that x and y are distinct)
and we ought to replace (43) with:
45) (x)(y)(if Gcd can make x and y possibly
distinct, then x and y are distinct)
But if we accept (44), we do so at a price. To accept it
requires that we countenance quantification into intentional
contexts
.
While it may be possible to construct a theory that will
allow such quantification without the familiar difficulties
,
it is
beyond the scope of this work to do so, and such a theory was
clearly not part of Descartes* technical apparatus. Without such
& theory, the conjunction of (44) and (45) seems to admit: of counter-
examples. For instance, I can conceive that Washington, D.C. and
the Capital of the United States are distinct, but they are not so
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in fact.
!a Edition, (44) seems to admit of counter-examples by
itself. Someone may conceive that Mark Twain end Samuel Clemens
axe distinct, though not even God can make them so. Their distinct-
ness couxd be conceived, for example, by one v;ho knew Samuel
Clemens as an affable boyhood friend and. was familiar with the
writings of Mark Twain, but didn f t know that Clemens wrote those
works pseudonymous lv. it is important: to note that, given the
peculiar character of (44), such a person is not conceiving that
Mark Twain is distinct from himself. That is a proposition that,
presumably, could not be conceived. Rather, what is being con-
ceived above is precisely that Mark Twain i£ distinct from Samuel
Clemens
.
We cannot escape the difficulties of (42) and (43) by supplant-
ing them with (44) and (45). However, there may yet be a way out.
In Principle LX Descartes suggests an argument like the one from
Medi tation VI
.
He says
:
. .
.we can conclude that two substances are
really disui.net one from the other from the
sole fact that we can conceive the one clearly
and distinctly without the other. For in
accordance with the knowledge which we have of
God, wa are certain that He can carry into
effect all that of which we have a distinct
idea.
.
.Similarly because each one of us is
conscious that he thinks
,
and that in thinking
he can shut off from himself all other sub-
stance, either thinking or extended, we may
conclude that each of us, similarly regarded,
is really distinct from every other thinking
substance and from every corporeal substance.
And even if we suppose "that God had united a
body to a soul so closely that it was impossible
to bring them together more closely, and made a
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single, thing out; of the two
,
they would yet
remain really distinct one from the other
notw ithsU ndirg the union; because however
closely God connected them He could not set
aside the power which He possessed of separa-
ting tnorn
,
or conserving them one apart from
the other, and those things which God can
separate, or conceive in' separation, are really
distinct.^
An even clearer variation of the argument from Meditation VI appears
in the reply to the second set of objections, in Proposition IV
jgguggnts Drawn u£ ij) Geometrical Fashion
. Descartes says:
God can effect whatever we clearly perceive
just as we perceive it (preceding Corollary).
But we clearly perceive the mind
,
i ,e
. ,
a
thinking substance, apart from the body, i.e.,
apart from any extended substance (Post. IX);
£nd. vice versa we can (as all admit) perceive
body apart from mind. Hence, at least through
the instrumentality of the Divine power, mind
caii exist apart from body, and body apart from
mind.
But now, substances that can exist apart from
each other, are really distinct (Def. X). But
mind and body are substances (Deff. V, VI, and
VII) f that can exist apart from each other
(just proved). Hence there is a real distinction
between mind and body 10
When he says that we clearly perceive the mind apart from the
body, I tcike it that Descartes can be interpreted as saying nWe
conceive that the mind and body are distinct,” 11 And that propo-
sition is one whose possibility God guarantees
. Nov; what is
different about this argument, and what gives us a clue for repair-
ing (H), is its explicit reference to substances as conceived to be
distinct, and as being possibly distinct. Further, when Descartes
says ”substances that can exist apart from each other, are really
distinct
j
n he again speaks only of substances, not of things in
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general
.
argument
,
Weiv we using (44) and (45) to reconstruct the above
we l'ave r° U»lt the range of our quantifiers to
substances only.
However, we need not appeal to those troublesome principles.
I think we can see a way of altering (42) and (43) to get a res-
pectable version of (H). Since Descartes has limited his interest
in the above argument to identity relationships between substances,
and since that is in fact his only concern in (H), let us replace
(42) and (43) with principles that reflect that fact. We can use:
4S) If I can conceive that two substances are
distinct, then they are possibly distinct.
and
47) If two substances are possibly distinct,
than they are actually distinct.
(46), it will bs noted, is an analogue of Hume’s Thesis
(discussed in Chapter II) for the distinctness of substances. It
is guaranteed by God’s power. If I can conceive of two substances
as being distinct, then God brings it about that they are possibly
distinct. (47), it will also ba noticed, is an analogue of
Plantings/ a principle (and possibly Long’s principle, both discussed
in Chapter II). It says in effect that if two substances are
identical, they are necessarily identical. So the present argument,
(if), has begun to look very much like the Argument from Conceivability
.
However, our rejection of the latter should not be oaken as
sufficient reason for rejection of the former. The similarity is not
that close. For example, our objection to Hume’s Thesis, the claim
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that what is conceivable is possible, in the Argument from Con-
ceivability was an objection to the effect that we ccn conceive
of the falsity of mathematical conjectures, which are necessarily
true if true at all, and so are not possibly false. But that ob-
jection will not work against (46). We must examine our version of
(H) find assess it on its own merits.
The reconstructed version of (H), then, goes as follows;
H f* 48) I am a substance.
49) My body is a substance.
50) I can conceive that I and my bodv are
distinct.
51) If I can conceive that two substances
are distinct, they are possibly distinct.
52) I and my body are substances that are
possibly distinct.
53) If two substances are possibly distinct,
then the y; are actually distinct.
54j 1 my body
At fi r'st glance it may seem that (H* ) is a faithful rendering of
neither the argument from Meditation VI nor the arguments from
Principle LX and Proposition IV, since the first premise of (H*
)
is contained in none of those arguments. While that is strictly
true, I don 1 1 think it poses any difficulties. Those who view
Descartes as having thought himself to be identical with his mind
should not object, since Descartes does say in Proposition IV
that minds are substances. (48) would follow from Descartes*
being a mind and the fact that minds are substances
.
Those who
hold that Descartes saw himself as a mind -body union usually held
that he was a substantial union, so they should allow (48). If
there are any who hold that Descartes thought himself to be a union
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of two substances that was not itself a third substance, then it is
not cleat to roe how they can interpret Descartes as having proved,
with the use of an argument like the present one, that he is distinct
from his body.
At any rate
,
the text from Meditation VI supports the view
that in claiming to be able to conceive that the mind and body are
separate, Descartes took himself to be involved in producing a
proof to the effect tnat he and his body are distinct. That is his
conclusion, and the French version of the Meditations
. which was
revised by Descartes, supports the view that he thought himself to
be identical v/ith his mind. It reads?
...it is certain that this I, that is to
say, my soul by which I am what I am, is
entirely and absolutely distinct from mv
body
There is no such clue to Descartes’ intent in Proposition IV,
since there his purpose is to prove the distinctness of mind and
body. But since ha elsewhere proclaimed that he is a mind or
thinking substance (e.g., in Meditation II and above in Principle LX),
the argument in Proposition IV easily lends itself to the adapra-
tion I have made of it.
I think, then, that (H J ) is acceptable as an attribution to
Descartes. We should assess its worth as an argument. It may
appear that Descartes could not convince a materialist with his
argument, for the latter would refuse to grant the conjunction of
(48) and (49). Once we allow those premises, he would claim, then
given Descartes' definition of substance as some tiling that can exist
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by itself without the aid of anything else
,
„e have given up the
ship to dualist,. But I don't think Descartes is guilty of such a
simple j think ha would grant at the start of the argu-
ment that tor all we know I and my body are identical. We know
only that they are substances, not that they are separate sub-
stances of the same kind, or, what is more to the point, that they
are separate substances of different kinds.
Giving different names to my body and me does not mark them
as different substances. Descartes affirms as much in reply to
Hobbes when he says:
Moreover
,
since we do not apprehend the sub-
stance itself immediately through itself, but
by means only of the fact that it is the sub-ject of certain activities
,
it is highly
rational, and a requirement forced on us by
custom, to give diverse names to those sub-
stances that we recognize to bs the subjects
of clearly diverse activities or accidents
,
and afterwards to inquire whether these diverse
names refer to one and the same or to diverse
things. But there are certain activities,
which we call corporeal ancT the substance
in which they exist is called body
. . .Further,
there are certain other activities, which we
call thinking activities,
.. .The substance in
which they reside we call a thinking thing or
the mind
. .
.
But after we have formed two distinct concepts
of those two substances, it is easy, from what
has been said is
i
the sixth Meditation, to
determine whether they are one and same or
distinct. 13
No doubt, it is partly because corporeal and mental attributes are
such diverse properties that Descartes is able to conceive the mind
and body existing separately, bat it would be unfair to accuse him
of having assumed at the outset that corporeal and mental propertie
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belong to different kinds of substance.
While (H* ) is not a petitio
. X think it does have insurmount-
able difficulties
. They are not unfamiliar ones. Hobbes* objection,
to which Descartes* reply was quoted above, was to the effect that
Descartes has assumed, rather than proved, that the thing that
things is incorporeal. Descartes protested that he rather left
the matter undetermined tut gave different names to mind (or, himself)
arvd body, arid only afterwards did he prove them distinct. Before
his proof he allowed the possibility that they were identical.
But to follow a now familiar route, if Descartes seriously
countenanced the possibility that he and his body were identical
then presumably he would accept:
55) X can conceive that I and my body are identical.
If (55) was a proposition whose truth Descartes would refuse to
grant j then he was at best being disingenuous in his reply to
Hobbes when he said that he did not assume himself to be incorporeal
prior to its proof in Meditation VI. If (55) was not true, that
is, if Descartes could not conceive himself to be identical with
his body, then he shouldn* t have held that as far as he knew, he
and his body were identical
. Of course
,
given that the only
property Descartes knew kUiself to possess, that of thinking
,
did
not seem to him to require a corporeal substance for its instantia-
tion, it no doubt seemed tc him more likely that he was distinct
from his body than that he was identical with it. But though it
did not seem to him that mental attributes required an extended
substance for their instantiation, if did seem so to Hobbes, and to
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accommodafe the latter, Descartes allowed that, so far as he knew
prior to Meditation VI, Hobbes was right.
But in accepting (55), Descartes has put his foot on a familiar
slippery slope. (51) is defended by appeal to the claim that
Gou*s power is sufficient to effect what I can conceive. Gcd makes
the conceivable possible. To protect Descartes against difficul-
ties involved with Hume f s Thesis, we limited our claim that God
makes the conceivable possible by restricting ourselves to identity
relationships among substances. But even given that restriction,
Descartes would seem bound to accept:
56) If I can conceive that two substances are
identical, then they are possibly identical.
since God makes possible all conceivable states of affairs with
respect to identity relations among substances. Then, given (48),
(49), (55), and (56), we can get:
57) I and my body are substances that are
possibly identical.
Moreover, the considerations that led Descartes to accept (53)
should also compel acceptance of:
58) If two substances are possibly identical,
then they are actually identical,
(53) camo from the claim that if God can make two things distinct,
then they are in fact distinct. That claim seems to rest on a
metaphysic \1 principle like:
59) (x)(y)(i.f x and y are substances and x is
identical with y, then x is necessarily
identical with y)
But if we accept (59), we should also accept:
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G0 ) <x)(y)(if x and y are substances and xdistinct from y, then x is necessarily
distinct from y)
By parity of reasoning with respect to the move from (60) to (68)
in Chapter II, to accept (59) while denying (60) requires that we
hold the dubious metaphysical principle that there exists a meta-
physical principle (viz., (59)) that holds for actual objects but
not for non-actual possible objects, or that it holds for things
that exist in this possible world but not for the denizens of other
possible worlds
. As I said in Chapter II, I know of no reason for
holding the metaphysical principle in question, and certainly none
can be found in Descartes T writings.
cso if Descartes accepts (H T ), then the same considerations that
led him to it should also force him to countenance the following
argument:
I. a) I am a substance.
b) My body is a substance.
c) I can conceive that I and my body are identical.
d) If I can conceive that two substances are
identical, then they are possibly identical.
e) I and my body are substances that are possibly
identical
.
f) If two substances are possibly identical, they
are actually identical.
gl I -- my Body
But Descartes v/ould not accept (I). I conclude, then, that he can
accept (H*
)
only if he refuses to allow that he can conceive himself
to he identical with his body. Since he seems to be committed to
the latter claim, he must reject (H* )
.
At: this juncture I should point out that it is possible to
interpret the passage from Meditation VI in a slightly different
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fashl'°n froi“ *hat 1 hav» doas
- The alternative interpretation is
suggested by Descartes in Proposition IV, quoted above. He seems
there to be offering the following argument:
H f *
.
48*) I ora a substance.
49
?
) My body is a substance.
50*) I can conceive of my body and me
existing separately.
51*) If 7. oan conceive of two substances
existing separately, then they are
possibly distinct.
52*
)
I and my body are substances that are
possibly distinct.
53*) If two substances are possibly distinct
1
—
r' ve actually distinct.
54 T ) I
-f my body
This argument, as an interpretation of the passage from
Meditation VI, would have avoided a number of difficulties that
beset the interpretation we settled on; however, it is ultimately
no more successful. The considerations, previously adduced, that
led us to regard Descartes as being committed to (55) are still in
effect, and so would preclude the use of (H**) as well as (H*).
How it may be thought that the Argument from Distinct Concep-
tion, which we have rendered finally with (H T ) (but which may be
rendered as (H* *)) is unlike the Argument from Conceivabiiity in
that, contrary to my contention, Descartes would deny that he can
conceive himself to be identical with his body (or1 inseparable from
it). It may be objected that when the Argument from Conceivabiiity
was advanced in Meditation II (if it was in fact there offered),
Descartes was more ignorant of his nature than he is at the point at
which he offers the Argument from Distinct Conception in Meditation
VI. For example, he claims to know after the investigation of the
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second Meditation that his entire essence is to think
. And if he
knows further that the entire essence of body is extension, then
presumably he could, with adequate justification, deny that he can
conceive himself to be identical with his body.
That objection is a strong one, to be sure. However, it is
so strong that if it holds, then the facts on which it is based
are alone sufficient to prove that Descartes is distinct from his
body
. He could argue as follows
:
a) I have the property of being essentially
a thinking thing.
b) My body does not have the property of being
essentially a thinking thing.
cj Ijs ray body
It appears
,
then, that an adequate defense of the first premise
of the Argument from Distinct Conception against its contrary can
also obviate whatever other difficulties the argument might have by
affording one whose premises would be entirely unobjectionable.
We should turn, then, to an assessment of the extent to which
Descartes was successful in establishing the claim that Ms entire
essence is to think. But before we do, there is another argument
that is clearly stated in Meditation VI, one which may make an
appeal to Descartes 1 essence unnecessary. We should digress briefly
for a look at that argument.
The Argument from Divisibility
In Ms Synopsis of the Meditations
,
Descartes informs us that
the sixth Meditation contains an argument for distinctness that is
different from the one we have been examining. After outlining the
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Argumenr from Distinct Conception, Descartes says of its conclusion:
This is . further confirmed in this same
Meditation by the fact that we cannot
conceive of body excepting in so far as
it i< divisible
,
v/hile the mind cannot
be conceived of excepting as indivisible.-^
The argument he is referring to appears some fev; pages after the
Argument from Distinct Conception. It is given in the following
passage:
In order to begin this examination, then
I here say, in the first place, that there
is a great difference between mind and body,
inasmuch as body is by nature always divisible,
and the mind is entirely indivisible
. For
,
as
a matter of fact, when I consider the mind,
that is to say, myself inasmuch as I am only a
thinking thing, I cannot distinguish in myself
any parts
,
but apprehend myself to be clearly
one and entire; and although the whole mind
seems to be united to the whole body, yet if
a foot, or an arm, or some other part, is sep-
arated from my body, I am aware that nothing
has been taken away from my mind
.
And the
faculties of wilding, feeling, conceiving,
etc
.
cannot be properly speaking said to be
its parts, for it is one and the same mind
which employs itself in willing and in feeling
and understanding. But it is quite otherwise
with corporeal or extended objects
,
for there
is not one of these imaginable by me which my
mind cannot easily divide into parts
,
and
which consequently I do not recognise as being
divisible; this would be sufficient to teach me
that the mind or soul of man is entirely differ-
ent from the body, if I had not already learned
it from other sources,
The passage can be construed as providing an argument for the
non-identity of Descartes arid his body, or for the non -identity of
mind and body. We can represent the two arguments as follows:
A. 61) My body is divisible.
62 ) I am not divisible
,
63) I fmy body
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B. 64) Body is divisible.
65j_M:uKi is not divisible
.
66) Hiad f body
Ir. each case the premises yield the conclusion by application of
Leibniz 4 Law. If Descartes is construed as offering (B), and not
(A), then to get the conclusion that he is not identical with his
body, he would have to further demonstrate that he is a mind. Then
he could use (6S) to establish the desired conclusion.
The worth of both (A) and (B) seems to turn on the truth of
their second premises. To evaluate his arguments, we can grant
Descaites the first premise in each case and proceed to an
assessment of the adequacy of his defense of the second premises.
To support (62) Descartes appeals to (i) his inability to distinguish
any parts in himself, and (ii) the fact that when he is aware of
the lo*s of a part of his body, he is also aware that nothing has
been lost from himself.
Descartes 1 first appeal is obviously unpersuasive. It does
not follow from his being unable to distinguish any parts in himself
that he in fact has none. It may even be false that he is unable to
distinguish parts in himself. It may be, for example
,
that his foot
and arm, which parts of his body he has distinguished, are also
parts of himself, though he remains ignorant of that fact. Nor can
Descartes here argue as follows:
67) My body has the propercy of having parts
that are distinguished by me.
68) 1 do not have the property of having
parts that are distinguished by me.
6S) I y- my body
since Descartes 1 only defease of (68) would be an appeal to the claim
that ha is not aware of being able to distirguish any parts of himself.
ttascart.es * second line of defense in support of (A) is no
stronger titan Ms first. His claim is that when he is aware of the
-lots of a part of his body, e.g., an arm or a leg, he is also
aware that he has not lost any parts. But surely Descartes is not
entitled to that claim. What he is entitled to, rather, is:
70) I am not aware of myself losing any parts.
But (70) does not entail:
71) I am aware that I have lost no parts.
It is the latter claim that Descartes needs to support the claim
that he is not identical with his body. But all he has available
is the former.
It may be that while (A) is unsuccessful, (B) isn't, and that
Descartes can appeal to the latter in establishing his conclusion.
In defense of (B) Descartes might appeal to the claim that when his
body loses a part its function is impaired, but the function of his
mind isn't
. Or, he may simply appeal to our intuitions, which
cannot be further supported, that when the body loses a part, the
mind doesn't also lose a part. I think that something like those
claims is adequate to support: the claim that a person's mind is not
identical with his whole body. But that leaves open the possibility
that the mind is identical with a part of the body.
There arc parts of the body, parts of the brain to be exact,
such that if they are lost, the function of the mind does seem to
be impaired. Descartes was not impressed by the fact that a loss
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of a limb, for example, might change the sensations present in the
mind, since he drew a distinction between purely cognitive activi-
taes end activities of the mind that resulted in part from its being
joined to and affected by the body. But Descartes should have been
disturbed by something like a prefrontal lobotomy, which would seem
to affect only the purely cognitive functions of the mind. Such a
change in the body would seem to effect a change in the mind and
would tend to weaken any argument to the effect that the mind is
not identical'-with any part of the body. At least it would weaken
the sort of argument under discussion. Such a fact does not, of
course, prove identity, but it does disarm Descartes* argument.
We should give up on the Argument from Divisibility and turn
to Descartes 7 claim that his essence is thinking, in hopes of
there finding material for a better argument for distinctness.
Unfortunately, it is not an easy task to find arguments in
Descartes* writings for the claim that his essence is thinking
. In
discussing Nakhnikian’s version of the Argument from Distinct
Conception, we found that Descartes asserts the claim in Meditation
VI, but no argument for it is there given. Descartes appears to
simply appeal to his ignorance of any other properties being essen-
trial to him. But as we saw, it is not clear why he thought thinking
was essential to him, nor does it follow from his not knowing him-
self to have any other essential properties that he in fact has none
We should look in the earlier writings for some more substantial
argument.
- 131 -
The
writings
f.xvst discussion of his essence that we find in Descartes 1
comes from Dart IV of the Discourse when he says;
I next considered attentively what I was;
and X saw that while I could pretend that
I had no body, that there was no world, and
no place existed for me to be in, x could
not pretend that I was not; on the contrary
from the mere fact that I thought of doubting
the truth of other things it evidently and
certainly followed that X existed. On the
other hand
,
if j had merely ceased to think
even if everything else that I had ever
imagined had been true
,
I had no reason to
believe that I should have existed. From
this I recognized that I was a substance
whose^ whole essence or nature is to think
and whose being requires no place and depends
on no material thing. 1 '
In Chapter II we interpreted this passage as providing the raw
materials of the Argument from Doubt. It is probably more correct
to interpret the passage as providing considerations in support
of the claim that Descartes* essence is thinking. But what are
those considerations? There seem to be two; (i) Descartes says
that from his doubting (or thinking) it follows that he exists, and
(ii) if he had ceased to think, he would have had no reason to
suppose that lie existed. Somehow these two facts are supposed to
lead to the conclusion that Descartes* whole essence is to think.
The Argument from Proof -Dependence
Anthony Kenny suggests, and rejects, the hypothesis that
Descartes is here relying upon the unexpressed principle that:
1) The existence of A depends upon B if, and
only if, the proof of the existence of A
depends upon B. 1^
Presumably Kenny sees (i) and (ii) as somehow establishing that
- 132 -
the existence °* ^cartes depends upon thinking. Also he must
holo that a thing’s essence consists in those properties its
existence depends upon. With respect to his principle, Kenny does
nov.
-specify what the permissible substitueuds of ’A’ and T F, f are,
but he does say that the principle, however we are to understand
it, is one that Descartes cannot accept.
Its unacceptability, according to Kenny, stems from the fact
that Descartes gave a proof for the existence of God that depends
upon Descartes’ having an idea of God. But since Descartes’
existence, and hence the existence of his idea, is contingent,
we wou^d net want f;o say that God’s existence depends upon Des-
cartes* having an idea of God. Still less would we want to say
thed, Descartes’ having an idea of God. is in some fashion a part of
the essence of God,. But Kenny apparently thinks that (1) would
commit us to such a view.
i'his objection to (1), though, does not seem entirely com-
pelling. Admittedly, it is Kenny’s principle and he should know
what is to count against it; however, it should not go unnoticed
that proofs for the existence of God have offered that do not de-
pend upon anyone’s having an idea of God. The difference I am
pointing to, of course, is between ontological arguments, which
depend upon the idea of God, and cosmological arguments, which
depend upon s ome person’ s idea of God. Descartes offers both.
Had Kenny expressed his principle as:
2) The existence of A depends upon B if,
and only if, there exists a proof of
A that depends upon B
.
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then las objection would have succeeded. But, as it stands, the
principle is ambiguous between (2) and:
3) The existence of A depends upon B if
ti.nd only if, all proofs of the existence
or A depend upon B.
if we ignore a third possible reading that recognizes only one
proof for the existence of anything.
If we read (1) as (3), which reading would seem more natural,
then Kenny* s objection surely fails. Since there is at least one
proof that does not depend upon some contingent being* s having an
idea of Gcd
,
(1) is not ruled out by Kenny's objection. It will,
of course, require that the idea or concept of God is essential to
God, but to the extent that we can understand that result at all,
it seems unobjectionable
. However, 1 think (1) is open to an
objection, beyond the obvious one that it is too vague to be easily
applicable. That objection, which takes advantage of the principle's
unperspicuousness
,
is that it makes the laws of logic, upon which
any proof depends, a part cf the essence of everything. Again, it
is difficult to understand what such a notion comes to, but while
the laws of logic may in some sense be said to be a necessary part
of my nature, they are clearly not a part of my essence in Descartes'
sense
.
Another objection can possibly be made to the principle
,
one
that again plays on its unpercpicuousness
.
Descartes’ proof of
the existence of matter depends
,
in addition to the goodness of
God, upon his having a clear and distinct understanding of matter
and a strong belief that it exists. So at least one proof of the
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existonee of letter depends upon someone's thinking, and it seems
further that anyone's producing such a proof will depend in some
sense upon his engaging in thought. So it may be said that the
proof, or every proof, of the existence of matter depends upon
there being someone who thinks the proof through. The same would
hold, or course
,
for the proof of the existence of anything. But
there being someone who thinks is not essential to matter or to
anything that exists
.
To be fair, it should be noted that (3) can be distinguished
from:
3*) The existence of A depends upon B if, and
only if, anyone f s giving a proof of the
existence of A depends upon B.
It may be that the above objection applies to (3 : ), but not to (3).
Also, if the present objection does succeed as an objection to (3),
then Kenny* s objection was correct, but not for the reason he thought.
At any rate, Kenny was right in rejecting (1); we should too.
Kenny * s Argument
In rejecting (1) we are confronted again with the need to
explain how the passage from the Discourse supports the claim that
Descartes 5 essence is thinking. Kenny has provided another inter-
pretation, which presumably he thinks is the correct one. Kenny
invites us to consider the following propositions that come from
the passage iu question:
4) I <m thinking
.
5) 7 have a body
6) I am in « wori
-1.35-
7) I am in a place.
8) I exist.
In regazd to these propositions Kenny says:
Descartes draws our attention to the following
rects about these propositions and their re-
lations to each other. First, (5), (6), and(// are uncertain, while (8) is certain, if
(4) is true, and (5), (6), and (7) are doubtful.
(8) is certain.
. .if (4) is false, and (5), (6),
and (7) are true, (8) is not certain...
From all this it follws that (4) is a premise
whose truth is both necessary and sufficient
to establish the certainty of (8); whereas
5
> (6), and (7) are premises none of which
is necessary, and which together are insuffi-
cient, to establish the certainty of (8). 1 -
Kenny tells us that while (5), (6), and (7) all entail (8),
they do not establish it as certain, because they are themselves
not certain. For one proposition, £, to establish another propo-
sition, as certain, Kenny says, £ must entail £, and £ must
itself be certain.
Descartes* conclusion is that his whole essence is to think
and that his existence is not dependent upon the existence of any
material thing, so simply pointing out the relationships that hold
among the above propositions is not adequate to explain how
Descartes got his conclusion. Kenny goes on to suggest a principle
that Descartes might have used to get his conclusion. He says:
One principle that would enable Descartes to
derive his conclusion from his premises might
run as follows. Those properties constitute
the essence of a thing that are severally
necessary and jointly sufficient to establish
the existence of that thing with certainty.
This principle coupled with the premise that
the single property of thinking is both neces-
sary and sufficient to establish with certainty
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»?.), i .,..
-
1
exa.s t^nce
,
will yield the conclusion
that r-<y essence is constituted by thought, 2 0
backbone of Kenny *s interpretation, then, is the principle:
r
->) (x)(the essence of x consists of that set
of properties. S, such that the members of S
are severally necessary and jointly sufficient
to establish the existence of x with certainty)
seem that if Kenny* s principle is acceptable, and if he
that the property of thinking is alone necessary and
sufficient to establish Descartes* existence with certainty, then
thinking is in fact Descartes* whole essence. Unfortunately, it
is difficult to evaluate Kenny *s principle owiiig to its unperspicuous
wording
,
his /.allure to define the notion of certainty he is using,
and his failure to say what it means for a property or set of
properties to be necessary and sufficient to establish the existence
of something with certainty.
The
It would
is right
Fortunately, we may not need to evaluate the principle, since
Kenny himself thinks it false. He undertakes to demonstrate its
falsity as follows:
These considerations notwi ths tending the prin-
ciple is in fact false, as is easily shown.
For let us suppose that it is true
,
but not
indubitable, that it is impossible to think
without having a body. Then all Descartes*
premises will remain true. Proposition (4)
alone will be necessary and sufficient to
establish the certainty of (8); for (5),
though it follows from (4) in conjunction with
the hypothesis that it is impossible to think
without having a body, is not certain since
that hypothesis is itself doubtful. 3uc
Descartes* conclusion will be false. For if
it is in fact impossible to think without
having a body, then it cannot be true both
that my essence is thinking and that my
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existence does not depend at all on the
existence o.t; any body. The suggested
principle
,
therefore, since it would permit
the crawing of a false conclusion from true
premises
,
must be rejected. 21
The false conclusion Kenny has in mind is:
10) My entire essence is to think,
which comes from (9) and:
11) Thinking is the only property that is
necessary and sufficient to establish
my existence with certainty.
Kenny *s strategy is to show that there is a possible situation in
which (11) is true and (10) false. That situation is one in which:
12) It is impossible to think, without having
a body
.
is true but not indubitable, i.e., not certain. If (12) is true
and t linking is essential to me, then, by the principle:
13) (x)(F)(G)(if F is essential to x and it
is impossible for something to have F
without having G, then G is essential to x)
having a body is also essential to me. Kenny does not explicitly
affirm (13), the principle that establishes that corporeality is
essential to Descartes, but he must hold it if his argument is to
succeed. Also, it is important that (12) be not indubitable, since
if it were, then (11) would be false. It would be so, because
(12), being certain, in conjunction with (4), would suffice to
establish (5) with certainty. (5) could then be used to establish
(8) with certainty.
Kenny * s argument, then, goes as follows. Since (10) 5.s entailed
by the conjunction of (11) and (9), and since (11) is true in the
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amagined situation in which (12) is also true, then either (11)
or (9) must be false. But given that (12) is dubitable
,
(11)
remains true. Therefore, (9) is false in our hypothetical situa-
tion. That is, there is a possible state of affairs in which (9)
is Adxse. But since if is a metaphysical principle, it is neces-
sarily true, if true at all. Not being necessarily true, it is false.
How should we assess Kenny *s objection? We must ask ourselves
whether he has made good on his claim to have shown (9) false. I
have suggested that he showed (9) false by showing it to be possibly
false
,
the latter being so when a particular imagined situation
obtains. Nov; there seems to be something suspect about that pro-
cedure. It seems that Kenny is trying to show a principle to be
possibly false
,
so he tells us to imagine a situation in which a
certain proposition is true, a proposition which, if true, renders
the principle ha is examining false. Admittedly, he is not asking
us to imagine the falsity of the principle under examination, but
what he does ask is no less illicit. When he asks us to suppose
(12) true, Kenny seems in effect to be claiming it to be possibly
true. That he must do in order to show his principle, (9), to be
false. But (12) is a modalized statement of the form nNec p_. r If
ry
it is possibly true, then it is true in fact/' -'1
We can now see the problem with Kenny’s approach. In holding
(12), in conjunction with the claim that Descartes is essentially
thinking, Kenny has in effect embraced the position that Descartes
is also essentially corporeal. His objection to the principle,
then, amounts to claiming it false on the ground that it renders as
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Descartes* only essential property that of thinking, while Descartes
is in fact also essentially corporeal. But that is to beg the ques-
tion. Kenny's argument against (9) is a petitio. so his attempt to
show it false has failed.
It may possibly be objected that I have misread the passage
in which Kenny tries to show (9) false. It may not have been
Kenny* s intent to affirm that (12) is possibly true. He may in-
stead have intended to affirm merely that (12) is epistemically
possible for him. When he asks us to suppose (12) true, it may
appear that Kenny there merely desires to point out what follows
ir it is true, as in fact for all we know it is. Then, my obiectcr
sayo
,
Kenny shows us that if Descartes is essentially corporeal, the
principle fails to reflect that fact, so it is false.
However, Descartes, or someone committed to (9), could reply
to Kenny by pointing out that of course the principle fails to
establish thinking as essential to Descartes, since it isn’t
essential to him. It is not sufficient to show the principle
false merely by showing that there is an epistemically possible
situation in which it gives a wrong answer to the question "what
is Descartes* essence." What has to be shown is that there is a
logically possible situation in which the principle gives a wrong
answer. It does not follow from the principle *s being epistemically
possibly false that it is logically possibly false
.
If the strategy
Kenny really employed was the one we are examining, then he certainly
has not succeeded in showing the principle false
.
Kenny see&is caught between a question-begging objection and no
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objection at all. if he offers the objection I have attributed to
him, then his objection is question
-begging. If he rather intends
to show what follows from a particular epistemically possible
situation, then he has no objection at all.
Despite the failure of his objection to it, I think Kenny’s
principle is indeed not acceptable. In the first place, it should
be viewed as unacceptable simply on the basis of its being not
sufficiently clear to be properly evaluated. But aside from that
difficulty, tc the extent that we can understand the principle
intuitively, there seems no reason why it should be accepted as a
principle for Descartes. Before raising objections to the principle,
Kenny attempts to defend it as follows:
Two considerations make this principle plaus-
ible. First, it seems reasonable to say that
those properties constitute the essence of a
thing that are severally necessary and jointly
sufficient for the thing to exist. Second, if
the holding of a giver, property makes "I exist”
certain, then a fortiori it seems to establish
it as true
.
22 ~
It should be obvious that Kenny’s notion of essence does not match
Descartes’
. The latter seemed to recognize only two condidates for
the essential properties of a created thing, viz
. ,
corporeality and
thought. An essence -finder principle for Descartes should be one
that tails us whether a thing has one, or the other, or both of
these two properties. But other properties, in addition to these,
will be necessary for a thing Co exist. Descartes, for example,
recognized duration as being such a property. Presumably he would
also have countenanced other universal properties
,
such as
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se li
-identity
,
as being necessary to the existence of a thing. So
Kenny’s notion of art essential property does not match Descartes’
.
/vctraiys having regarded necessary properties as essential leads
us to wonder whether, contrary to his view, it might not be the case
that universal properties do fit Kenny^s essence
-finder principle,
(9). Again
,
it is not clear what Kenny means by a pronosition’s
being certain, but it seems that:
14) I am self
-identical
.
is certain if anything is, and it seems further that (14), if true,
entails that I exist. But the characteristics of being certain and
entailing that I exist are just the characteristics that led Kenny
to say that (4) establishes (8) as certain. It would seem, then,
that the property cf self-identity is sufficient to establish my
existence with certainty. But if that is so, then it is not clear
how (4), or any other proposition could be said to be necessary
to establishing my existence with certainty. Admittedly, if I
prove that I exist, then I have to think in order to do it, but I
don’t need to use (4) as a premise in such a proof. So it appears
that thinking, contra Kenny, is noc necessary to establish my
exis tenee with certainty
.
It seems, then, that there may not be any property that fits
Kenny’s principle, since no property seems necessary to establish
my existence with certainty. Thinking is not necessary, since we
can appeal to the former. It may be that when Kenny’s principle is
made sufficiently clear it will be seen that my objection does not
apply, but until the principle is made clearer, we should reject it
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and look elsewhere.*^
Malcolm’s Principle
Norman Malcolm has offered an essence
-finder principle that he
thinks Descartes might have been relying upon in the Discourse and
second Meditation .25 He SUggests the general principle:
15) If there is an existing thing 0 and if
there is something E, such that if one
perceives E, necessarily one perceives 0
and if one perceives 0, necessarily one
perceives E, then E is the essence of 0.^^
from tills general principle Malco3jn derives a principle for Descartes
to apply in his own case:
16) x is my essence if it is the case that
if I am aware of x then (necessarily)
1 am aware of myself and if I am aware
of ray If then (necessarily) I am aware
Malcolm further suggests that thinking is the only property that
fits (16), thus we should conclude that thinking is Descartes’
essence
,
Two points should be made here. First, (15) is defective in
that, as it is stated, if E is the essence of 0, then 0 is likewise
the essence of E. It may be that thinking is Descartes’ essence,
but it surely is not true that Descartes is thinking’s essence.
This defect of (15) is repaired in (16); however, (15) and (16)
share a different defect. Malcolm has misplaced the necessity
operator in each. As he has constructed the principles, the scope
of their necessity operators is limited to the consequent of each
conditional in which they appear; they should carry the whole
- 143-
conditional within their scope.
We needn’t spend much time evaluating (16), since Malcolm
turnself rightly rejects it with the claim that there is no apparent
reason why it should be regarded as providing Descartes’ essence.
Malcolm claims that the first conditional in (16) holds trivially
for every property and the second holds for thinking, not because
it is essential to Descartes
,
but because of the fact that Descartes
held that awareness was a kind of thinking and that we are aware
of aj.l of cur thoughts. Thus, by the second conditional, if X am
aware of anything at all, then I am aware of thinking.
While I think Malcolm is right in rejecting (16), I think he
has not given all the reasons sufficient for doing so. For
example, it is not clear to me that thinking does in fact fit the
first condition in (16). Malcolm argues that, for Descartes,
whenever I think, I am aware that I exist, and in being aware that
I exist, I am aware of myself.^ He cites as evidence for his
claim the familiar passage in Meditation II in which Descartes says
that the proposition that he exists is certain only for as long as
he thinks
. But since it does not follow from that fact that at
every moment at which I think, I am aware that I exist or I am
aware of myself
,
Malcolm has not persuasively established the claim
that thinking fits the first condition of (16).
Even if Malcolm could successfully establish the claim that he
is aware of himself whenever he is aware of thinking, then the
principle would be open to a counter-example. Given that Malcolm,
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in order to make the principle work, needs to subscribe to the view
that Descartes thought of himself as being aware of all of the
thoughts that he has
,
then it would turn out that being aware of
his
was
And
vAirikung was essential to Descartes. That is, whenever Descartes
o^are of himself, he would be thinking and aware of his thinking,
whenever he was aware of his being aware of his thinking
,
he
would bo aware of himself (given the success of Malcolm T s argument
that Descartes is aware of hirnself whenever he is thinking). Cut
whereas Descartes may have held that he was necessarily aware of
his thinking
,
he did not hold that being aware of his thinking was
a part of his essence.
Failing the efforts of Kenny and Malcolm to provide a success-
ful essence -finder principle, we should go to the texts and attempt
to tease out the arguments Descartes saw as proving his essence
to be thought ,
^
The Argument from Systematic elimination bv Doubt
Finding Descartes ''1 arguments for Ids essence is a source of
considerable consternation, to be sure; however, there is a claim
in Descartes* writings that has provided far more perplexity to
cosnmen tutors
. I am referring, of course, to the Cogito , the claim
T
'I think
,
therefore I am. ft There is one interpretation of Descartes'
effort to establish the claim that he exists that may shed some
light on his effort to discover his essence
.
The search that terminated in the Cogito was a search for a
proposition that is certain, or indubitable. Descartes seems to
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equate certainty with induhitability, at least when he is attempt-
ing to discover that most fundamental proposition that is to ha the
bedrock for his reconstruction of knowledge. An obvious strategy,
then j, for rinding a certain, or indubitable, proposition is to
engage in a systematic attempt to divest oneself of every belief
that can for any reason be doubted, if one finds a proposition
that cannot be doubted, then the search lias ended. That proposi-
tion is of the sort that Descartes is seeking.
It is reasonable, then, to interpret Descartes as having
proceeded in this fashion in the Cogito passages
, He systematically
throws out every proposition or class of propositions for which he
can find any reason at all to doubt. Descartes admits that he may,
in the process, threw away some true propositions, but his search
is not for what is merely true, but for what is certain. He
arrives after a while at the proposition "I exist." It is one that
cannot be doubted, since any attempt to doubt it guarantees that
it is true. For Descartes, any attempt to doubt a proposition is an
activity of thinking, and no such activity exists without a thinker;
hence, any attempt on Descartes 1 part to doubt that he exists
requires that ho be thinking, and his thinking in turn guarantees
that he exists. Thus Descartes has found a proposition that is
certain for him, one that cannot be doubted, by systematically
doubting all of the propositions that he formerly believed until he
found, one that could not be doubted, i.e., one for which there was
no possible reason to doubt.
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I'he foregoing is one way in which the Cogito passages can be
interpreted
, I don’t claim that it is the best interpretation that
is available. Nor even do I believe that it is sufficiently clear,
without being more thoroughly detailed, to be seriously evaluated.
We would first have to say at least something about the notions of
certainty and indubitability that Descartes was relying upon. But
it is the general strategy that is important for our purposes
here, and a view of that strategy can be garnered and appreciated
without our attempting to make the interpretation clearer.
Now there is some evidence that Descartes intended such a
strategy to establish that his essence was thinking. It is
possible to interpret Descartes as having attempted to discover his
essence by systematically doubting himself to possess each of the
properties he formerly took himself to have until he arrived at one
that he could not doubt himself to have
. In the second Medi tation
,
immediately after establishing that he exists, Descartes says:
Put I do not yet know clearly enough what I
am; and hence 1 must be careful to see that
J. do not imprudently take some other object
in place of myself, and thus that I do not
go astray in respect of this knowledge that
I hold to be the most certain and most evident
of all that I have formerly learned. That is
why 1 shall now consider anew what I believed
myself to be before I embarked upon these last
reflections; and of my former opinions I shall
withdraw all that might even in a small degree
be invalidated by the reasons which I have just
brought forward, in order that there may be
nothing at all left beyond what is absolutely
certain and indubitable.-^
Descartes then discovers that he can doubt himself to hove
all of the corporeal properties that he formerly took himself to
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liave. He can doubt that he has a face, hands, arms, bones, flesh,
etc. But he cannot doubt that he thinks:
...What of thinking? I find here that thought
is an attribute that belongs to me; it alone
cannot be separated from me. I am, I exist,
that is certain
. But how often? Just when I
think; for it might possibly be the case if I
ceased entirely to think, that I should like-
wise cease altogether to exist. I do not now
admit anything which is not necessarily true:
to speak accurately I am not more than a thing
which thinks, that is to say a mind or a soul,
or an understanding, or a reason, which are
terms whose significance was formerly unknown
to me. I am, however, a real thing and really
exist; but what thing? I have answered: a
thing which thinks
When he says that thought alone cannot be separated from him,
we unierstand Descartes as saying that thought is the only one of
his properties that resists Cartesian doubt. He cannot, with
consistency, imagine himself to be without that property. Since
it is the only property he lias found that he cannot doubt himself
to have, Descartes concludes that his essence is to think.
The same strategy appears again in The Search After Truth ,
when Polyander, after claiming that ho can doubt himself to have
any corporeal properties, says:
Of all the attributes which I bestowed upon
myself
,
only one remains for me to examine
and that is thought; and I see that it is
the only one that I cannot separate from my-
self. For if it is true that 1 doubt just
because I cannot doubt that I do so, it is
also equally true that I think; for what is
doubting but thinking in a certain way? And
in fact if I did not think, I could not know
whether I doubt or exist. Yet I am, and I
know it because I doubt, that is to say because
I think. And better, it might be that if I
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ceased for an instant to think I should cease
at the sane time to be. Likewise the sole
thing I cannot separate from me
,
that I know
certainly to be me and that I can now affirm
without fear of deception-
-that one thing
,
I
repeat, is that I am a thinking thing. 32
It seems clear, then, that at least one strategy Descartes
employed to establish thinking as his essence was that of elimina-
ting any property he could doubt himself to have. Descartes does
not say explicitly here what makes his possession of a given
property indubitable, but it is possible to hazard a guess. He
cannot doubt that he thinks, because his doubting that he thinks,
since doubting is a species of thinking, entails that he thinks.
So, we might offer the following principles to apply to the present
investigation of Descartes 1 essences
21) a cannot doubt that he lias F =df a knows
that his doubting that he has F entails
that he has F.
22) F is essential to a if, and only if, a
cannot doubt that he has F.
Certainly Descartes did not appeal explicitly to these prin-
ciples
,
but 1 think that something like them may have underlain
his thinking . We should add a caveat, however. As it stands, (22)
is incomplete. In the first place, we should add a conjunct to the
effect that F is not a universal property. But even given that
restriction, (22) would still make essential to Descartes other
properties that he did not recognize as essential. For example,
according to (22), the property of doubting would be essential to
Descartes
.
However
,
we saw in Chapter I that Descartes wants essential
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properties to be of a higher level of generality than that,
Descartes would hold that while he essentially thinks, he does not
have as part of his essence any of the specific activities that
fall under the genus n thinking.” We have expressed this point
earlier by referring to Broad 1 s differentiating attributes, which
make use of the determinable
-determinate distinction. I don*t
think we can adequately express that distinction by adding another
conjunct in (22); however, it should be kept in mind that admissible
substituends of *F* are limited to names of those attributes that
Descartes would countenance as being proper candidates for his
essence
.
Principle (22) is beset by one other difficulty that merits
mention. That difficulty is that the principle, as worded, works
only for persons, if it works at all. Now this is also a difficulty
shared by Malcolm* s principle, and possibly by Kenny* s. At any rate,
bodies do not turn out to be essentially extended on Kenny *s
principle. It would be nice to find in Descartes* writings the
suggestion of an essence-finder principle that would be purely
general in application to all substances, or even just to all created
substances. Unfortunately, I rind no such suggestion.
Nov; that we are reasonably clear about the suggested strategy’
Descartes might have been employing, we should assess its worth.
Recall that X suggested that the strategy of systematic doubt might
under lie Descartes* effort in the Cogito passages . There he was
looking for an indubitable proposition
,
and it seems reasonable to
-set about finding one by systematically throwing out all of the
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possible candidates that can be doubted. Once one is found that
cannot be doubted, the search is over. As Descartes admitted,
there may have been truths that were passed over in the search, but
that is acceptable as long as one is found about which he can have
no doubt. The strategy of systematic elimination by doubt seems
respectable in the Cogito sections
.
However, it is not clear why we should expect the strategy to
be successful in the search for Descartes* essence. There is an
important difference retween the enterprise of searching for a
foundation for knowledge and that of searching for a thing’s
essential properties
. We might characterize the difference as that
that holds between the search for an epistemic fact and the search
for a metaphysical fact. Indubitability is an epistemic nocion.
It makes sense to look for a proposition that cannot be doubted
when one is searching for an epistemic foundation block. However
,
it is not clear why one should seek those properties a person
cannot doubt himself to possess when one is trying to discover that
person’s essential properties. The latter is a metaphysical search,
not en epistemic one
.
Two problems present themselves here. First it is not clear
what reasons there are for thinking that the appropriate non-universal
properties that fit (21) are essential to their possessors. Second,
it is not clear what reasons there are for thinking that the appro-
priate non-universal properties that fail to fit (21) are not essen-
tial to their possessors. On the face of it, there does not seem to
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be any connection between the properties I can or cannot doubt
rayself to have and those that I have essentially.
Thinking seems to fit (21) simply because in order to employ
the principle I have to doubt
s
and since doubting is a species of
thinking
,
my employing the principle assures that I will manifest
the property I attempt to doubt myself to have. But it is not clear
why that fact should lead us to believe that thinking is essential
to me. further
,
it seems that corporeality might be essential to
rne
,
so that my doubting entails my being corporeal. But since I
don't know myself to be essentially corporeal, J don't know that
the entailment relationship holds
. Hence
,
I can doubt that I am
corporeal. My being able to doubt that I am corporeal seems con-
sistent with my being essentially corporeal. It simply is not
clear why (21) should be taken as showing me not to be essentially
corporeal
.
Nov/ there is one possible link that I can see between proper-
ties I cannot doubt myself to have and properties that are essential
to me. It might be said that if I can doubt myself to have a cer-
tain property, then I can conceive of myself existing without it.
Similarly
,
if I cannot doubt that I have a certain property, then
I cannot conceive of myself lacking it. If we now introduce, as
a replacement for (22), a variation of the essence -finder principle
that Chisholm has suggested for Descartes (cf. Ch.II):
23) (x)(F)(x has F essentially if, and only
if, x cannot conceive himself except as
having F)
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reme>nbering to ras triet the range of our property variable to
admissible candidates for Cartesian essencehood, then we may be
able to make the present strategy respectable
.
fhe principle (23) can now be conjoined with the following
principles
:
24) (F)(if I cannot doubt that I have F, then I
cannot conceive myself except as having F)
25) (F)(if I can doubt that I have F, then I can
conceive myself as lacking F)
2G) a can doubt that he has F =df it is not the
case that a cannot doubt that he has F
to yield the conclusion that thinking is essential to Descartes.
Since thinking is the only admissible property that Descartes
cannot doubt himself to have, it is the only property that he
cannot conceive himself except as having, and hence, the only
property that is essential to him.
Unfortunately, I think the suggested revisions fall short of
making respectable Descartes * strategy of systematic elimination by
doubt. First of all, it is not clear why we should accept (24).
Again, the tension is between an epistemological fact and a meta-
physical one
. My inability to doubt that I have some particular
property derives from an epistenrdc fact, whereas my being unable
to conceive myself lacking some property is metaphysical in
character. Wow it may be that if I can doubt that I have a certain
property, then I can conceive myself .lacking it. But it does not
seem that my inability to doubt (as defined in (21)) that I have
some property is grounds for holding that 1 am unable to conceive
that 1 lack that property. It may in fact be that I am both unable
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to doubt that I have the universal properties I have and cannot
conceive myself except as having them. But the same does not seem
to hold with regard to thinking. At least there does not seem
to be the connection between ability to doubt and conceive that is
requisite to the truth of (24).
I think we can provide an argument to show the unacceptability
of the conjunction of (21), (23), (24), (25), and (26). If that
v onjunction is unacceptable, the principles in it cannot be employed
by Descartes to establish his essence. To begin we must make the
philosophically sound assumption that statements attributing
essential properties to a thing are necessarily true if true at all.
That assumption is surely a reasonable one, since if something, a,
has some property, F, essentially, then it would seem that no
possible world is such that *a has F essentially* is false in that
world
But if such statements as *a has F essentially* are necessarily
true if true at all, then if a has F essentially, it would follow
by strict implication from a*s doubting that he has F essentially,
that he does in fact have £ essentially. For example:
27) Jones has the property of being essentially
a thinking thing.
follows from:
28) Jones doubts that he has the property of
being essentially a thinking thing.
where (27) is necessarily true. However, Jones may be ignorant of
the entailment relationship between (27) and (28), in which case:
29) «Jones is able to doubt (27).
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would also be true. So by (23), (25), and (23), Jones does not
have the property of being essentially a thinking thing essentially.
Nov it might be supposed that an essentia.list would hold the
following principle s
3C) (x)(F)(if x has F essentially, then x
essentially has the property of having
F essentially)
If Descartes held (30), then there would be a conflict for him
among (27), (30), and:
33.) Jones does not have the property of being
essentially a thinking thing essentially.
However, we must remember that Descartes held that persons have one
essential property only, so I think he would be undisturbed by (31),
since he would not accept (30).
Something like the above strategy, however, can be used to
show the unacceptability of the proffered principles that we have
suggested for Descartes. We have earlier distinguished between
those properties a thing has necessarily and those that are
essential to it in the Cartesian sense. A thing has a property
necessarily if, and only if, it has that property in every possible
world in which it exists
.
But not all properties that a thing has
necessarily are properties that are essential to it. For example,
the property of being self -identical is, for Descartes, we can
suppose . had necessarily by everytiling, though nothing has it
essentially. Descartes would, however, hold the following principle:
32) (x )(F) (if x has F essentially, then x has
F necessarily)
since a thing has its essential properties in every world in which
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it exists, end that is just what is meant by saying that something
has a property necessarily.
In addition, whatever considerations give rise to Chisholm’s
principle
, (23), should also lead to an acceptance of:
32) (x)(F)(x has F necessarily if, and only
if
,
x cannot conceive himself except as
having F)
where the property variable in the latter takes as values all
properties. The only difference between (32) and (33) lies in the
range of their respective quantifiers and the fact that one treats
of necessary properties where the other treats of essential proper-
ties
.
We saw above that someone might doubt that he has the
property of thinking essentially, and so could conceive himself tc
lack that property. By the same consideration, a person may be
able to doubt that he has the property of thinking necessarily.
Jones
,
for example
,
may be able to doubt:
34) I have the property of being necessarily a
thinking thing.
and so would hold:
35) I can conceive myself lacking the property
of being necessarily a thinking thing.
By (33), then, Jones could derive:
36) I do not have the property of being necessarily
a thinking thing necessarily.
However
,
given that we have been using S5 semantics
,
we seem bound
to accept:
37) (x)(if x is necessarily F, then x is
necessarily necessarily F)
So if Jonas is not necessarily necessarily a thinking thing, then
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by (37) he is not necessarily a thinking thing. Hence, by (32) he
is not essentially a thinking thing either. But that is a result
Descartes would not accept and it is inconsistent with the claim
that Jones is essentially a thinking thing, which can be demonstrated
by use of the principles ((21) and (23)
-(26)) that were adduced to
prove that Descartes* essence is thinking.
The problem, I think, again lies in taking (21) to yield truths
relevant to the search for a thing* s essence. There is no reason
to accept it in conjunction with (22), nor is there any reason to
accept it in conjunction with (24). And there is good reason for
not accepting the conjunction of (21), (23), (24), (25), and (26).
They, together with other principles they seem to commit us to,
load to contradictions
. I know of no way that we can salvage the
Argument from Systematic Elimination by Doubt to get a successful
proof for the claim that Descartes' essence is to think.
The Cartesian Circle Argument for Essence and Distinctness
I can see or.e last argument for his essence that Descartes might
be interpreted as having offered. That is the following:
A. 38) I clearly and distinctly perceive that
my essence is to think.
39) Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive
is true ,
My essence is to think
.
This is an argument similar to one that I earlier suggested as an
interpretation of the passage in Meditation VI that deals with the
distinctness of Descartes and his body . We have heretofore bean
supposing that Descartes* conclusion that his essence is to think
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could be used by him to prove distinctness. But if the above
argument for his essence is successful, then Descartes could also
have used a similar argument to prove that he is distinct from his
body
, He would not need to reason from his essence.
I said earlier that tiiere is some evidence that Descartes
.intended such an argument to prove distinctness
r
possibly he also
intended it to prove that his essence is thinking. That evidence
comes not from a careful reading of the sixth Meditation
,
but from
what Descartes claimed to have been the function of his argument
there. In reply to /crnauld, Descartes claimed that the considera-
tions adduced in Medi t at. ion II were sufficient to adequately prove
that mind and body are distinct. The purpose of considering the
topic again in Meditation VI was rather to allay metaphysical
doubt. He says:
Consequently, if I had not been in search of a
certitude greater than the vulgar, I should have
been satisfied with showing in the Second Medi-
tation that Mind was apprehended as a thing that
subsists, although nothing belonging to the body
be ascribed to it, and conversely that Body was
understood to be something subs! stent without
anything being attributed to it that pertains to
the mind . And I should have added nothing more
in order to prove that there was a real distinc-
tion between mind and body; because commonly we
judge that all things stand to each other in
respect to their actual relations in the same
way as they are related in our consciousness
.
But, since one of those hyperbolical doubts ad-
duced in the First Meditation went so far as to
prevent me from being sure of this very fact
(viz. that things are in their true nature exactly
os we perceive them to be), so long as I supposed
that I had no knowledge of the author of my being,
all that I have said about God and about truth in
the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Meditations serves
to further the conclusion as to the real dis-
tinction between mind and bodv, which is finally
completed in Meditation
I take this passage to support an interpretation of the sixth
Meditation according to which Descartes intended the following
argument for distinctness:
B. 41) I clearly and distinctly perceive that I
am distinct from my body.
42) Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive
is true.
43T 1 am distinct from my body.
In his reply Descartes speaks of proving the distinctness of mind
from body, but since he identifies himself as a mind in Meditation
II and since ha claimed to have proved the distinctness of himself
and body in VI, we are justified in offering (B) as an interpreta-
tion of his intent.
As I pointed out earlier in this chapter, the worth of argument
(B), to which we can now add (A), clearly turns on the extent to
which Descartes was successful in defending the second premise of
his argument. Descartes* defense of the principle:
44) (p)(if I clearly and distinctly perceive p,
then p is true)
occurs in the fourth Meditation . However, that defense rests on
the goodness of God, and so it requires the existence of God. In
Meditation III Descartes presents a number of arguments for the
claim that God exists, but it seems that each has at least one
premise in whose defense Descartes appeals to his clear and distinct
perceptions . Many critics have claimed to find a kind of circularity
in Descartes * arguments that God exists and that his clear and
distinct perceptions are true. Arnauld was the first such critic
.
35
Clearly, then, the success of (A) and (B) depends upon the
extent to which the criticism of Arnauld was justified and the
extent to which Descartes was successful in answering it. There
exists, of course, a whole tradition of Cartesian scholarship
devoted to assessing the worth of Arnauld* s criticism and Descartes’
reply
.
Certainly it is still an unsettled question whether
Descartes is guilty of the charge of circularity . 36 And since it
is beyond the scope of this work to add significantly to that
controversy, we must leave open the possibility that the Cartesian
Circle Argument for Distinctness is ultimately successful.
For that reason, we must close this essay still unsatisfied
whether Descartes was in fact successful in proving himself to be
distinct from, his body. We have examined a fair number of arguments
for that conclusion, some of them explicitly offered by Descartes,
others merely suggested by him, and a few with little mors to recom-
mend them than the fact that Descartes could have offered them had
he been so inclined. But all that we have examined share the common
fault of failure
.
The argument most often attributed to Descartes, the Argument
from Doubt, m saw to ha invalid. We have seen also that a few
common threads of difficulty run through most of the other arguments.
The strongest of those threads was spun by Descartes* concern to
avoid a petltio by allowing that, prior to his attempt to prove
distinctness, he was, so far as he was aware, a material substance
~l6o
with the property of thinking
. That position was one adopted by
some of Descartes 1 critics, notably Hobbes, against whom Descartes
was concerned to protect himself. But in allowing the reasonable-
ness of the view he was opposing, Descartes seems to have disarmed
many oi /els own arguments
. Those are the arguments that are genera-
ted by the claim that Descartes can conceive that he is distinct
from his body.
To assure the success of those arguments
,
Descartes should have
given considerations to the effect that he cannot conceive of him-
self being identical with his body. But, quite the opposite, he
made concessions that can only be construed as committing him to
the claim that he can conceive that he is identical with his body.
But that commitment precludes the use of arguments from conceiv-
ability. One consideration that Descartes might have advanced to
plead the non-conceivability of Ms identity with his body is his
claim that his essence, but r.ct his body f s essence, is to think.
However, we have seen reason to think that he was not successful in
establishing that claim either.
bfe leave Descartes, then, with only one unexamined possibility
for proving distinctness, the Cartesian Circle Argument. So while
we haven* t shown that he successfully proved Mmself to be distinct
from His body 3 neither have we shovm that he failed.
- 161 -
NOTES
CHAPTER III
1. HR
-II
,
63.
2. HR
-’II
,
64. See also HR-II, 30; HR-II, 133; and HR-II
,
211.
3. HR-I, 190.
4. Of. my discussion of exportation in Chapter II.
5
• M Introduction to Philosophy , p . 147 .
6. Descartes possibly means to defend the claim that thinking is
his only essential property by appeal to the claim that it is
the only property he knows himself to possess
,
since he can
doubt his possession of any other property. We will discuss
that defense later in the chapter.
7. An alternative reading of the first premise of (H) is suggested
by Descartes in Replies to Objections II according to which
we should replace^(38y”wii:h:
38*) If I can conceive that x and y exist
separately, then x is distinct from y.
We will consider the argument that so results somewhat later.
8. HR-I, 440
„
9. HR-!, 243-4.
10. HR-II, 59.
11. Descartes con also be interpreted as having claimed that what
he clearly perceives is that the mind and body can exist
separately, the possibility of which state of affairs would
he guaranteed by God. . That suggests a different argument for
distinctness, one that will be considered below.
12. HR"I
,
190.
13. HR-II, 64.
14. MR-I
,
141.
15. HR-I
,
196.
- 162 -
16. Descartes does not actually assert (id) with respect to
himself
, but rather with respect to his mind. However,
we must assume that the same considerations apply in both
cases, since Descartes here seems to switch back and forth
between talk of himself and talk of his mind.
17. HR-I
,
101.
13. Descartes
. p. 81.
19. Ibid
. , pp. 81-82.
20. Ibid
. ,
p. 83.
21
. Ibid
. ,
pp. 83-84.
22. ftgain, I take us to be speaking Sj-ishly.
23. Descartes
, p. 83.
24. I am grateful to Fred Feldman and Richard Feldman for helping
aa come to grips with Kenny 1 s discussion.
25. "Descartes f s Proof that His Essence is Thinking,’5 Doney,
pp. 312-337.
26. Ibid., p. 315.
27. Idem .
2G. 7m attempt to provide a Cartesian analysis of fx has P essen-
tially’ has recently come to my attention. It might be
possible to construct an essence -finder principle from such
an analysis. Peter J. Loptson (Cartesian Essentialism, Ph.D.
Dissertation, Univ. of Pittsburg" 19727 has attempted to pro-
vide necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing’s having
a property essentially in Descartes 1 sense . Loptson also
refers to Broad’s concept of a differentiating attribute as
capturing Descartes* notion of an essential property , and he
tries to give formal expression to the conditions Broad placed
on differentiating attributes. Unfortunately, Loptson
1 s work
has come to me too late to be treated here; however, it appears
that Loptson has not found in Descartes any arguments defending
his views about essence. Further, Loptson’ s analysis seems
defective in that it lias the consequence that a thing can
have the property of thinking without having it es sen tidily.
That is a consequence that I believe Descartes would no>. ecuept
.
I am inclined to think that a thorough reading of Loptson will
uncover many other points of dispute with my own interpretation
of Descartes
.
-163-
29
.
Ibid
. , pp . 318-319
.
30. HR-I, 140
.
31. HR-I, 151-2.
32. HR-I, 522.
33. Formal, but not philosophical, problems might be created by
our assumption. In particular, we may need to use modal free
logic to express it formally, since under some semantic
interpretations *Nec Fa* is true only if a exists in all
possible worlds
.
The problem lies solely in giving formal
expression to our philosoj>hical intuitions
.
34. HR-II
,
101.
35. HR-JI, 92.
36. A worthy, and very promising, effort has recently been made
by Fred Feldman to finally settle the question in Descartes*
favor. See his "Episfende JippraisaJ and the Cartesian Circle,"
yet to appear at this writing.

